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1. 
TI~TRODUCTION 
French West Africa contains a population of almost 
nineteen million people within an area of 1.8 million square 
miles, a land three-f!fths the size of the United States. l. 
Rapid political development is taking place in each of the 
eight territories of Senegal, Ivory Coast, Dahomey, ~~ure-
tania, Guinea, Upper Volta, Sudan, and Niger, which are 
collectively known as "Afrique Occidentale Frangaise." 
Basic structural changes in the government are being pro-
posed, new coalitions and political parties are being formed 
almost weekly, and the old leadership is g iving ivay to men 
of much more radical ideas. Policies and principles which 
were accepted almost as axioms in French West African poli-
tics since the beginnings of political activity are being 
re-examined and denied. Legal and social issues and pro-
blems which seem to be crucial and essential are quickly 
resolved or forgotten as the political spotlight shifts to 
ii. 
a different arena. 
What is the "rea,l issue" in French West Africa? 
In the February 1958 issue of Current History, one author-
ity made the very fashionable and not unreasonable state-
ment that ••• "Separation from France is not an important 
issue. The real issue has been the form to be taken by the 
union with France."2·on February 15, 1958, complete inde-
pendence was proposed by important leaders of major African 
political parties. 
In French West Africa moreover, one sometimes has 
difficulty in discovering between 1-1hich interests the sig-
nificant conflicts of the future '\·Till occur. For example, 
are the divisions of interest between the poorer inland 
territories (Niger, Sudan, Mauretania, Upper Volta) and the 
wealthier coastal territories (Senegal, Guinea, Ivory Coast, 
Dahomey) so great as to prevent effective collaboration of 
the Africans in asserting their demands of the French? The 
movement of a few months ago to Lmite all the African poli-
tical parties into a grand coalition has been brought to an 
abrupt halt. Differences and factions within the largest 
political movement, the Rassemblement Democratique Africaine, 
which were ostensibly amicably settled and compromised less 
than a year ago, have, within a few short weeks, re-emerged 
to the extent that the Ivory Coast section of the party is 
violently demanding policies totally opposed by most of the 
rest of the movement. Several commentators have pointed out 
iii. 
that the influence of individual leaders, their hold on 
the popular imagination, is one factor which helps to ex-
plain political groupings~ Gueye, Sissoko, and Houphouet-
Boigny are heroic figures. Part of the strength of the 
parties they lead is a reflection of the emotions of loyal-
ty which they as individuals arouse. PerP~ps these shifting 
policies and internal conflicts within the R.D.A., and the 
difficulty in forming a united African party, are primarily 
due to personality clashes, and the future of A.O.F. will 
depend on the success of various individuals with differ-
ing policies. 
But even if we assume that personalities play a 
large part in French \'lest African politics, l-rby have the 
leaders, until recently at l east, followed such vastly dif-
ferent aims from those of the African leaders in BFitish 
West Africa? vfuy are they so late in beginning to call 
for independence, and why does this demand come at this par-
ticular time in their history? There are still no cries 
of "Freedom!" nor slogans of nself-Government Now!" as in 
the Convention People's Party of the Gold Coast. On the 
contrary, there is an extremely sophisticated self-awareness 
on the part of political leaders that theirs are underde-
veloped areas in an interdependent atomic age of great al-
liances. There is no1v arising ho"1ever, a growing division 
bet'\"leen radical and moderate French \vest Africans on this 
very issue. Some wish to bind themselves more closely to 
iv. 
France. An apparently ever larger number trTOuld 11 opt for 
independence." The question must be posed, rlhy does this 
schism occur nol'T, and how deep is it? 
The distinguishing feature of political parties in 
French West Africa is the success of three of them - the 
Rassemblement De'mocratique Africaine, the Mouvement Social-
iste Africaine, and the Convention Africaine - in establish-
ing thems elves as pan-territorial movements. The R.D.A., 
for example, has been particularly successful, and now con-
trols the governments of four of the eight territories. 
The success of these parties is in striking contrast to the 
ethnically based parties of British West Africa. In Nigeria, 
the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons is an 
Ibo-based movement, the Action Group is primarily Yoruba, 
the Northern People's Party has the majority of its sup-
port amoung the Rausa and Fulani, and the country is now 
deeply troubled by demands for many separate state movements. 
The Convention People's Party of Ghana depends for most of 
its support on the Akan peoples of the South. The Ashanti 
based opposition party would establish a very loose con-
federacy, if it were to come to pO\'Ter. Every particularly 
based political party finds it extremely difficult to build 
up a strong organization outside its s pecific ethnic reg ion. 
The success of the A.O.F. political parties in es-
tablishing pan-territorial movements is obviously not due to 
any homogeneity of the area. The diversity of this vast 
v. 
region - half the size of Europe - is more striking than 
even th~ diversity of Nigeria. Nomadic Moors and Tauregs 
connected by ties of history, culture and religious alle-
giance vrith !~orocco and North Africa, with their highly 
stratified social systems dominated by the military and re-
lig ious castes, live in 1•1auretania and the northern parts 
of the French Sudan and Niger. The Malinke, Bambara, Sara-
kolle and Songhai peoples live further south and have a 
tradition of large, organized kingdoms. The semi-nomadic 
Fulani stretch across West Africa from Senegal to the Camer-
oons. There are the Mossi of Upper Volta with their ancient 
kingdoms of Yatenga and Wagadugu, and the Wolofs of Senegal, 
'vho have been longest in contact with France. There are 
various forest peoples, the Soussou in Guinea, Baoule in 
the Ivory Coast, Fou in Dahomey - some, the the Floup with 
a loose equalitarian political system, others, like the Fou, 
with an elaborate state system that has survived since the 
sixteenth century. This tremendous diversity of tribal, 
social and political structure is further complicated by the 
existence of over one hundred languages, which makes commu-
nication difficult. 
However, '\'lhile certain peoples, for example the i'lolof, 
¥1alinke, Bambara, Mossi and Fulani, are clearly of special 
importance from the standpoint both of their numbers and 
history, none plays a role in contemporary politics comparable 
to that of the Akan i n t .he Gold Coast, or of the Yoruba, 
vi. 
roo and Rausa peoples in Nigeria. 
What then, are the factors \·rhich unify French West 
Africa , v.Jhich make it possible for pan-territorial parties 
to be successful here, vrhereas they flourish nowhere else 
in Africa to such a degree, and 'ltrhat are the prospects for 
their continued integration~ 
In the course of this thesis, while paying particular 
attention to the mLique pan-territorial parties, and attem~ 
ting to analyze the factors in their rise and in i'That may 
now be their de cline, I shall attempt to ans1-ver some of 
the other questions which I have herein raised, particularly 
in regard to the demands for independence and unity. To 
this end, I shall first cite the importance of colonial 
policy for political development, establishing the political 
and legal frame'\'!Ork within 1vhich the political parties are 
~ble to operate , and contrast the French with the British 
policy in this regard. I shall then briefly indicate the 
respective strength of the various ,parties, by citing the 
results of the 1957 elections and the composition of the 
Territorial Assembl ies by party affiliation, and then go 
on to di scuss other factors in the political setting . In 
/ turn, I shall g ive the histories of the Ras semblement Demo-
cratique Africaine (R. D.A.), the Mouvement Socialiste Af-
ricaine (M.S.A.), and the Convention Africaine (C.A.), ana-
lyze their organizations, occupational bases, stands on the 
key issues of independence and federalism, philosophies , and 
vii. 
factions within the parties. The chapter on the Socialist 
parties, hmvever, will be spotty and shallmv in comparison 
to the treatment given the R.D. A. because of the almost 
complete lack or availability of material. 
A study of the proposals and semi-failure of the 
attempt to unite the African political parties vJill be 
follO'\ved by an appraisal of t he prospects for unity and 
cooperation. In this final chapter, I shall examine more 
closely some of the unique intra-territorial political pro-
blems and conflicts. 
The unevenness of treatment accorded various as-
pects of this topic is sometimes attributable to the nature 
of the subject, but more often is directly associated \'lith 
the abundance or paucity of material accessible in French 
and English. The general lack of available information is 
bewildering and disheartening, and t he cause of much misin-
terpretation and inaccurate prediction. Virtually every 
subject raised in this paper could possibly, if the material 
were available, be pursued in greater depth. vfuat I have 
attempted to do is to indicate various problem areas l'lithin 
my subject and analyze them to the extent of the resources 
available. The responsibility for all translations from 
the French, unless otherwise stated, is mine. 
viii. 
FOOTNOTES - I NTRODUCTION 
l. Vid, Appendix I 
2. Quigley, Carrol, "French West Africa", Current History, 
February, 1958, page 91. 
3. Hodgkin, Thomas, nThe French Impact on West Africa", 
West Africa, January 2, 1954, page 1232. 
1. 
CHAPTER I 
COLONIAL POLICY AND THE INSTITUTIONAL FRANETtlORK 
The colonial policy of the Imperial power is sig-
nificant in three major v1ays for the development of African 
political parties: 1) the degree of freedom allowed the Afri-
cans to organize; 2) the institutional framework provided, 
especially constitutional provisions for popular participa-
tion in government via the electoral process; and 3) the 
declared political objective of the colonial rela tionship.l. 
It is a general historica l fact that the above 
three elements of colonia l policy are interrelated. For ex-
ample, when the institutiona l framework is amended to pro-
vide for additional r epresentation by Africans, their free-
dom to organize is generally also expanded and, in the ul-
timate analysis, the political objectives of the colonial 
relationship will be changed. It must also be rememb ered 
2. 
that the development of African political parties in turn 
influences the colonia l policy by the growing pressures these 
parties are able to exert. These interrelating trends are 
best observed by an historical approach. 
Freedom to Organize Befor e 1944 
As a general rule, nntil 1944, French colonial 
institutions and French yolicy regarding freedom of associa-
tion, speech and press did not allow for political a ctivity. 
The colonial regime before the Second World War was charac-
terized by bureaucratic government and an all-powerful ad-
ministration, and ruled, up until 1946, by decrees. The 
system allowed the central government to have complete con-
trol and gave full power to the higher civil servants. 
These officials, due to their wide powers and a 
disinterested National Assembly, were masters in the colonies, 
and at the head of a hierarchica l and authoritarian system 
in which the Africans had virtually no representation. 
Democrat ic rights were only g iven to the white colonists 
and limited as much as possible. Julien '\'Trites that the 
temptation to punish trouble ma'kers ivas strong, amd that 
the number of convictions always increas ed when the a dminis-
tration needed labor. 2 • Eve!'ywhere there '\'Tas direct ad-
ministra tion without concern for the political education 
of the African. No move toward independence was ever com-
templated. The vast majority of op inion accepted the theory 
of the absorption of the colonies by· France and disliked 
self-governn1ent. The intention was to turn the natives in-
to nee-Frenchmen by naturaliza tion, to have the colonial 
peoples absorb French culture so that they might become 
French citizens. The colonies \·;ere to bee ome overseas parts 
of France, and , as such, their economic relationships, con-
stitutiona l position, and administrative organization were 
to be identified \-Ji th those of any part of France proper. 
3. 
Increasing pressures, beginning in the period direct-
ly preceding Vlorld vT9:r II, were applied to this system by a 
growing number of Africans self conscious of their subju-
gation. Roads and r ailways had broken dov1n tribal isolation. 
The disruption of the old, traditional systems~ along with 
the impact of western education and the development of com-
merce~ tD~ew up a new elite of government interpret ers, teachers 
and t raders. In sum, the same type of inevitable process 
'\·Thich occurred in British \'lest Africa and els9i-Jhere, pop-
ularly referred to as 11 detribalization" or 11 v;es t erni.zation" 
occurred also in French West Africa. And, as in British 
Africa, the educated men complained of being employed ohly 
in lower administrative posts, and of having no political 
rights. The discontent of the educated elite was strong. 
Their influence was felt by the masses, and there \vere some-
times 8&'1.o.us indid.ents. 
4. 
The Brazzaville Conference: 
Prouosals for a New Institutional Framework 
The Second ~'lorld War forced a revision of France's 
colonial policy. ~~en in June, 1943, a Free French Govern-
ment in exile ~vas formed, a new colonial policy w·as fashioned 
.,.. 
under the leadership of de Gaulle and Pleven, his Commissioner 
for the Colonies. On M. Pleven's initiative, an imperial 
conference was called at Brazzaville from January 30 to 
February 8, 1944. It was essentially a conference of colon-
ial administrators - the governors of the African colonies 
and their principal asslstants. African leaders were not 
invi'ted. The firm conviction ~t;as expressed that France and 
her overseas territories must remain united: "The aim of 
France in her civilizing work in the colonies excludes any 
idea of self-government, any possibility of development 
outside the French Empire; the formation of independent 
governments in the colonies, ho~·lever distant, cannot be 
contemplated." 3. The rapporteur said at Brazzaville: 11 'Yle 
visua lize the Empire in the Roman sense of the '\wrd, not 
in the Anglo-Saxon sense." 4· 
On the other hand, there was a marked hostility 
to the exces s ive centralization of the pre-war system. It 
was stated that a l arge measure of administra tive freedom 
was required in the interests of t he colonial peoples and 
territories. The experience of all the French governors 
during the war was that their position had been much 1m-
s. 
proved when they were freed from a certain form of narrow 
and- petty tutorship exercised in peace-time by the Ministry 
of Colonies. Convinced that the time had come 'l>then the 
people overseas should be associated with the government 
and administration of their territor ies, the Conference made 
a number of fairly liberal recommendations. 
The Conference called for representation by all 
the colonial territories in the Constituent Assembly which 
l:Tould be called to draft the new French constitution. Par-
ticipation of colonial territories in the political institu-
tions in France \vere to be incr eased, but not by augmenting·· 
the number of seats in the Chamber of Deputies. Some type 
of French federation or federal assembly seemed to be neces-
sary. Every1>rhere in the overseas territories, local assem-
blies composed of Europeans and Africans, elected as far as 
possible, were to be created. A large degree of adminis-
trative decentralization permitting independent technical 
and economic planni..'Yl.g '\vas to be permitted. Traditional in-
stitutions \vere to be maint ained as the means most likely 
to promote vigorous local and regional activity, but 
French would remain the only language taught in the schools. 
The Government wished to give practical effect to 
the recommendations of Brazzaville, and on !"Iafa'ch 27, 1945, 
the Minister of Colonies announced that "the Indo-Chinese 
federation, together 't·ri th France and other parts of the 
community will form the French Union.5· This seemed to 
imply the crea tion of a f~deral organiza tion, but in fact 
the Government had not yet decided its policy by the time 
the First Const i tuent Ass embly met to draw up the new con-
stitution. 
African Participa tion in Metropolitan Institutions 
The gr eat innovation of t his Assembly was the 
fact that all the colonies v1ere asked to choose represen-
tatives, and that many natives sha.red in dra'\·ting up the 
Constitution. De Gaulle decreed that the members of the 
Constituent Assembly be elected in each colony, with minor 
exceptions, by two electoral colleges, one for the citi-
zens and one for the non-citizens. In all, the overseas 
terri~ories had sixty-three representatives. 
Robinson s-tates that the decis i on to ext end re-
presenta tion in the First Constituent As s embly to all parts 
of Overseas France had a decisive influence on the shaping 
of the cha racter of politica l parties and political demands, 
for this made it inevitable that these ar eas should continue 
to have representation in metropolitan institutions, which 
meant in turn that they ,.,ould become de eply involved in 
6. the party politics of Metropolitan France. Territorial 
parties, in f a ct, first sprang into ex istence as vehicles 
for the election of pepresentatives for the First Constitu-
ent Assembly and the one following it, and they provided a 
mechanism of mobilization for the subsequent election of 
7,. 
deputies to the National Assembly. 
Because of domestic differences in France, the 
Constitution v;as rejected by the referendum of May 5, 1946, 
' but the important Lamine Gueye law, which made all inhabi-
tants of French colonies citizens,was passed by;: the National 
Assembly. 
The Second Constituent Assembly (which met from 
June to November 1946) adopted the new principles laid down_ 
by the First Convention, such as the grant of human rights 
and citizenship, the creation of local assemblies, and the 
right to citizenship without prejudice to existing rights. 
This last point was very important, because before the war 
citizenship involved the acceptance of French private law 
and was one of the fundamental grievances of the national-
ists, especially the Moslems. These principles were incor-
porated into the Constitution which was ratified by the 
referendum of October 13 and promulgated on October 27, 
1946. The French Union was now legally constituted. 
1 46 Constitution 
Expanded Freedom to Organize 
Chapter VIII of the Constitution dealt with the 
French Union. The principle that "France and the overseas 
people constitute a Union founded on equal rights and duties 
without distinction of race or religion" condemned in 
theory racial or religious intolerance, and was used by 
Africans as a basis for concrete demands. Citizenship was 
8. 
extended to include all subjects of the French Union. This 
was the most important measure, for it eliminated the former 
fundamental distinction between citizen and non-citizen. 
(Previously, non~citizens, the mass of Africans, were sub-
jected to a special system ltnown as the "Indigenatn 1r1hich 
virtually deprived tham of the liberties of criticism, as-
sociation and movement.) Now, freedom of the press was 
extended to the native newspapers. Freedom of association 
and public meeting were also extended to the overseas ter-
ritories. Forced labor was abolished. 
(2) New African Political Institutions 
In each territory, an elected assembly was set up 
and a Great Council was established to represent inJest Africa 
as a whole, with its members elected by the Territorial 
Assemblies. It contained forty members, five from each 
territory. The creation of these assemblies was undoubted-
ly the boldest act of the Constituent Assembly, for it 
prepared the way for federalism and a great shift in de-
centralization, even though the assemblies were not given 
any legislative powers and were merely advisory bodies. The 
only area over which they exercised any real control was 
over customs and tariffs, but currency control rested wit~ 
the metropolitan authorities. 
(3) New Institutions in Paris with 
African Representation 
The Second Constituent Assembly set up three cen-
tral organs of the French Union: the office of President, 
the Higher Council, and the Assembly (not to be confused with 
the National Assembly). The ::Pr esicent of the Republic 'triaS to 
be the President of the French Union, and in this capacity, 
was to preside over the Higher Council, convoke the Assembly, 
and enact with the Cabinet decrees for each territory after 
consulting the Assembly. He was to appoint with the Cabinet 
the Government Representatives throughout the Union. Although 
-. 
the powers of the President were more formal than substantive, 
except in exceptional circQ~stances, there were demands that 
the representatives of the various other member states of 
the Union should also preside in turn over the Higher Council. 
The Higher Council was supposed to assist the 
Government of the Republic in its general direction of the 
Union, and was supposed to be composed of delegates of the 
French Government and representatives of the associated states. 
It was to be only consultative. 
The Assembly of the French Union wa s thou~ to be 
a daring achievement, since it could possibly have become 
a federal assembly. It was to have 240 members, half re-
presenting Metropolitan France and half the overseas ter~i­
tories. T"\'To-thirds of the representatives from France were 
to be elected by the National Assembly and one-third by the 
Council of the Republic by a method of proportional represen-
10. 
tat ion -rThich t-tas to reflect the political groupings of the 
National Assembly. Representatives of the overseas terri-
tories were to be appointed by the local assemblies. The 
po,vers of the Assembly t-Tere to be extremely limited, re-
stricted in legislative matters to dealing with bills or 
proposed legislation on '\"rhich the National Assembly or the 
Government asked its advice. The Government actually did 
so only v!hen obliged by law·. In the administrative field, 
its advice had to be sought before French legislation could 
be extended by decree to overseas territories. This was 
its most important function, as decrees formed the main 
body of legislation. It could submit proposals for legis-
lation to the Government, but its suggestions could be 
brushed as ide, and it could barely hope to delay, much lese 
block, any legislation or decrees. The National Assembly 
normally i gnored its existence. 
In sum, the French Union remained, after the reforms 
of 1946, still mainly a fiction with the French government 
in reality remaining supreme, l egislation belonging solely 
to Parliament, and the administrAtion in the colonies 
wielding the real authority. 
The Loi Cadre of 1956:The Present Framework of Government 
The ensuing debacle of the disintegration of the 
French Empire removed many of the illusions held for the 
success of the 1946 French Union. The fact that further 
11. 
changes were needed if A.O.F. was to retain its relative 
tranquility was coming to be admitted even before the final 
\ 
cap itulation in Indo-China, the introduction of I·1.endes-
France 's policy in Tunisia , the rene1-ral of the bankrupt 
policy of strength in Morocco, and the outbreak of the 
Algerian rebellion. 
In April 1954, during a general debate on the policy 
in overseas territories, the Government s pokesman admitted 
that major changes, including a revision of the Constitution, 
1vere needed. Among the Government proposals, it was sug-
gested that: territorial assemblies should have greater 
powers, including the right to decide all matters not ex-
pressly reserved to Parliament or other metropolitan assem-
blies; liason between the governor and assembly should be 
provided for in a "Council of Government" composed of re-
presentatives from the assemblies as well as nominees of 
the governors; and elected local councils should be estab-
lished in rural areas. 
The elections to the National Assembly in Janu-
ary 1956 clearly demonstrated the strength in African ter-
ritories of moderate nationalism. It was obvious that the 
Africans demanded, and would have to be granted, some real 
transfer of power. Some high officials in the territories 
had been urging such r eforms. But even where reform was 
enacted, such as in the 1955 Municipality Reform Bill, 
12. 
vrhich created and defined the functions of forty-four new 
municipalities while establishing a common electoral roll, 
French political conditions ma de for ' inordinate d~lay. 
The 1'-iolletGovernment, in February 1956, intro-
duced a bill which sought to overcome this difficulty by 
prescribing general lines of reform and leaving deta ils to 
be settled by decrees, drafts of which \'rere to be submitted 
to the Assembly of the French Union according to a time-
table; these bills, if not amended or rejected by Parlia-
ment within four months, would come into operat ion as they 
stood. 
This "Loi Cadre" of June 1956 provided for vital 
changes in the institutional structure of the Over seas 
Territories: 
1. Universal suffrage and a common electoral roll 
wer e established in all territories. 
2. It authorized the establishment in each terri-
tory of a Council of Government to administer territorial 
services. This Council also had the power to repeal or 
1<. "" amend decrees, arretes, andstamtes applying to it, vlhich 
had been enacted before the coming into effect of the re-
form. 
3. Appropriate corresponding changes in the func-
tion and powers of the Governor-General and the Grand Coun-
cils of West and Equa~orial Africa were also authorized. 
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4. District and other local councils were to be 
set up in rural areas. 
The underlying theory of the Loi Cadr e was to af-
firm the political personality of each territory and to 
minimize that of the ''federation" of A.O.F. and A.E.F. At 
the same time, a division of powers between the metropoli-
tan and territorial governments was also implied. Since 
1948, some branches of the public service organization 
(administration, judiciary and police·' were directly paid 
for by the metropolitan budget, while many of the remainder, 
.. 
although paid for from the local budget, were never con-
sidered as local. It was now provided tha~ the public 
services should be reorganized into State(metropolitan) 
services and territorial services, and that entry into 
both by the natives of the territories should be facili-
tated. 
A series of decrees covering all the overseas 
territories was later implemented to supplement the Loi 
Cadre, and dealt with the definition of State service, the 
reorganization of the civil service, the creation of a 
special regime for the postal and telecommunication ser-
vices, and the financial obligations of the Territorial 
Assemblies. None of these decrees were referred to the 
Territorial Assemblies concerned, but, as pr~vided in the 
Loi Cadre, to the Assembly of the French Union and to 
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Parliament. This was done because of the need for speed 
and the number of territories involved, but it is now most 
unlikely that a similar absence of consultation will prove 
politically poss.ible in the future. 
A number of constitutional problems arose in the 
implementation of the Lei Cadre. Since the overseas terri-
tories were legally parts of the Republic, it could be ar-
gued that the 1946 Constitution applied to them, and that 
Article 76, which provided that the representatives of the 
Government in each territory (the Governor) was the head of 
the administration of that territory, as well as Article 1, 
which stated that France was an indivisible Republic, 
precluded the establishment of an executive elected by and 
responsible to the Territorial Assembly. 
When the draft Loi Cadre was put before the National 
As s embly in February 1956, the Government argued that it 
was within the Constitution, since the powers of the members 
were derived from the Governor. This theory was sufficient 
to establish the legi tima~y of the Lei Cadre, but -vras not 
wide enough to encompass later reforms demanded by African 
leaders, and it therefore became the subject of future con-
troversy. 
In certain spheres, the powers of the Governors, 
both legislative and executive, '\'Jere to be exercised in Coun-
cil. The Council was to be collectively responsible, although 
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one of its members might be selected to g ive the as s embly 
any explanation required in regard to a particular decision. 
The major issue in formulating the Loi Cadre was 
not over any of i t s main principles, i.e. division of 
powers between metropolitan and territoria l government, 
sep~ration of state and territorial services, ex t ension of 
po'\'Ters of the Territorial As s emblies. Rather, t he confl i ct 
came over the establishment of a similar body at the level 
of the group of terr itories. · One mi ght say that the crux 
of the matter was the composition of the Councils of Govern-
ment and their responsibility to the Territorial Assemblies. 
It was finally decid ed, a f .!f;; er much debate, tha t 
all member s of t h e Councils be elected by the AssemblJ. . 
They i-rere to be presided over b;)j• the Governor a nd vlere 
to consis t of at lea st six and not more than t 1velve mem-
ber s. Each member of the Territor ial Assembly would have 
to vot e for a comj_)lete lis t of candidates and vrould not 
be able to add or remove a ny names from it or alter the 
order of names. The candidate heading the winning list 
would be Vice-President of the Council of Government. 
The members of the Council wer e to be ca l l ed Ministers. 
It was also decided that the Council i'las to be 
responsible to the As s embly. This proposa l reneived the 
const itutional deba te, for there were tho s e ivho claimed 
this provision vmuld create autonomous govern .. rnents and 
16. 
in contradiction to Article 76 of the Constitution, the 
Governors would no longer be at the hea d of the adminis-
tra tion in the territories. On the other han d , it '\t;as 
successfully argued tha t so long as t h er e were state ser-
vices, controlled by the Governors, while the territorial 
services xould be the only concern of the Territorial 
Councils and Assemblies, the territories remained only 
collectivities comparable to departments, and vrere ex-
. pressly recognized by Article 85 of the Constitution. 
Respons i bility for the management of one or 
more territoria l services would be delegated to each 
minister by the Governor on the recommendation of its 
Vice-President whose signature would be required on the 
Governor's arret~ defining a minister's function. 
A minister was respgns~b~e tp the Council for 
his administration, 'tvould be free to resign, and could be 
discharged by the Governor on the proposal of the Vice-
President. 
In the absence of the Governor, the Vice-Presi-
dent '\trould preside at meetings of the Council. He 
vrould also submit to the Council the annual report on its 
act~vities, and he was to present the report on territor-
ial services to the Assembly • 
. The Governor had "reserved powers" not only in 
the legislative, but also in the executive sphere. The 
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areas of state services were s pecified. Externa l affairs 
and defense, the monetary and financial systems, the 
guaranty of civil liberties, the representation of the 
Central power, and the maintenance of the solidarity of 
the constituent parts of the Republic and its expansion 
in the economic, social and cultura l spheres, constituted 
the "general interest" of the Republic to be managed and 
administered either by state services or public boards 
or corporations under state control. Six groups of state 
services were specified: 
a. External affairs (diplomatic and consular, 
frontier control, external trade and ex'C.hange control, 
immigration, cultural relations) 
b. External Communications (aviat ion, air safety 
and meteorology, radio communica tions and submarine cables, 
lighthouse and beacon ships) 
c. Defense and Security (armed forces, police, 
customs, security police, civil defense and economic mo-
bilization) 
d. Civil Liberties (courts of French justice, 
i.e., excludin g courts of customary law in priva te la\·T 
matters, administrative courts, police judiciary and labor 
inspection) 
e. Solidarity and Economics, Social and Cultural 
Expansion (treasury, financial supervision, supervision 
of state companies and mixed companies, central develop-
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ment projects financed by F.I.D.E.S., distribution among 
territories of products which may be .said to be subject 
to quotas, map and survey service) 
f. Representation of the Central Poi.;er ( High 
Commissioners, Governors, Heads of Provinces and Adminis-
trative Districts, and their secretaries and cabinets) • 
The overseas deputies opposed the inclusions of 
custom services among the state services on the grounds: 
1) that they were largely manned by existing local cadres; 
2) that the rate of customs duties had been settled by 
territorial assemblies and Grand Councils in the past. 
The Government promised that the local people \muld retain 
their jobs in the new state services. 
Labor inspection was made a state service at the 
request of the overseas deputies in accordance with the 
wishes of the trade unions, because the local administrat-
ors were themselves large employers. 
The cost of state services, most of irlhich irrere 
met in the past from territorial revenues, was to be pro-
vided for in the metropolitan budget. However, territories 
it/ere nmt required to contribute five per cent of the total 
receipts accruing to them from the customs service, pro-
vided that this does not exceed tim-thirds of the actual 
cost of the service, and, in addition, to make a contrib-
ution towards the cost of such other state services as were 
previously met from territorial funds. At least two-thirds 
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of the positions in the state services overseas '\'ras to be 
reserved for Africans. 
The Territorial Assemblies were granted new powers. 
Previously, their main pmvers ivere financial, although con-
trol of the budget \'las limit ed, ~ for it had to provide for 
11 obligatory ex:pendi tures 11 • The Governor '\'tas required to con-
sult them before making arr~tes on s pecified subjects, and 
might consult them on other matters, but the As s emblies had 
no legislative pm·1ers; their role 1·ras purely advisory. 
Under the new system, the Assemblies have full con-
trol of the budget ex9ept for the requirement that it be 
balanced. Obligatory expenditures are limited to public 
debt and pension charges, deficits on previous budgets, ex-
penditures on ~nternational conventions, travelling expenses 
of territorial representatives in Parliament, costs of elec-
tions, and certain port inspections, rebates to municipal-
ities of their shares of taxes levied locally and contri-
butions to scientific research. 
Legislative powers of the Assemblies cover a '\'Tide 
range, including agricultural matters, forestry, fisheries, 
primary and secondary education (except curriculum and exam-
ination), health, produce inspectiom, customary law, internal 
trade, savings banks, to~m planning, public libraries, cul-
tural centres, physical education and s port, and the general 
cordition of service of the territorial public services. 
In most of these matters, their regulations may modify legis-
lation and decrees made before April 1957, and penalties are 
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attached to the breaking of their laws. Territorial Assem-
blies a lso legislate on many financial matters including 
taxation, although legislation relating to certain taxes 
which accrue to the budget of the groups of territories is 
reserved to the Grand Councils. Their decisions, and 
those of the Grand Councils, on customs, including tariff 
rates, remains subject to approval by the metropolitan 
gove;finment. 
~he High Commissioner derives most of his po'\-rers 
from his position as "Depository of the Powers of the Repub-
lic11 and head of the state services throughout the group. 
He is therefore in charge, f or example, of defense, security, 
external affa i rs, declaration of a state of emergency, and 
the coordination of state and territorial services. His 
functions as head of the group of territories are limited, 
as are those of the Grand Council, to economic and financial 
coordination within the group, and the direction of the var-
ious interterritorial services s pecified in the decree. 
For these purposes, he has a financial service, a service for 
economic coordination and one for problems of economic de-
velopment common to the group. There were only three other 
services at the group level ,,.hich 1-1ere authorized by the 
decree: geology- and mineral prospecting, control of major 
ep idemics, and disease control. 
The Grand Council was given genuine legislative 
powers in the area of interterritorial services listed above, 
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as well as in a few minor matters (e. g . navigation in inter-
territorial 1vaters). It also continued to control the group 
budget into which was paid not all indirect taxes as in the 
past, but the revenue from all import taxes, half the reven-
ue from export taxes, and mineral and oil royalti es. Ex-
penditures were to be limited to the minimure interterritorial 
services and to grants-in-aid to constituent territor ies. 
Its powers '"ere therefore very small in comparison to those 
of the Territorial Assembli es. 
An intert~rritorial conference of governors, 
Vice-Presidents and members of the Councils could be sum-
moned by the High Commissioner to discuss matters of common 
interest, and this conference had the final decision on ir-
reconcilable interterritorial disputes, after consulting 
with the Assembly of the French Union. 
The significance of the Loi Cadre was tremendous, 
for 1vhile it was a devolution of pm1er v{i thin a limiting 
system, it \'las a political and not merely an administrat-
ive devolution. It also established an elected, responsible 
cabinet form of government for the first time. However, 
the legislative powers of the Territorial Assemblies, al-
though genuine, were limited to specific subjects unlike 
Togoland or the Cameroons, \·rhere the area of metropoli ta.l'l 
.. 
legislation i·las strictly defined, and all other matters fall 
to the territorial governments. The French Na tional Assem-
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bly, moreover, retain ed formally unfettered legislative 
pmqer (the power · of the Territoria l Assemblies to modify 
or abrogate laws or decrees was donfined to legislation 
pa s sed before the reform law), but in practice, leg islation 
by the French Pa rliament must be reduced if all the re-
forms are not to be meaning~ess. 
There are certa in '~:r eakness e s in the Loi Cadre, 
which might hamper the crea tion of nresponsible loca l minis-
ters ., : 
l)The method by which the Council of Government 
and its Vice-President is elected could limit the Vice-
President in his choice and later his control of his minis-
terial cabinet colleagues; 
2) The possibility of evading r e sponsibility is 
inherent in the Governor 's continued presence in the 
Council; 
3) Above all, the absence of any power of dissolu-
tion could easily lea d to Assembly domination of a weak and 
7· unstable ex ecutive. 
What l'Tas signif icant ho·Never, was that new politi-
cal bodies had been constructe~ and that Africans could 
express themselves through these new institutions. 
Extension of the Franchise 
It must also be kept in mind that at the same time, 
the number of African electors and participants in demo-
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cratic procedures was be ing increa sed. The scale of poli-
tica l activity was therefore cons i der ably wi dened with the 
r ap id extension of t he franchise throughout "Afrique Noiret1. 
In 1946, there ex isted a sizeable body of 1,300,000electors. 
By 1956, 9 ,000 ,000, or thirty per cent of the population, 
could vote; and wha t wa s ·cons i der ed universa l suff rage 
vlas· rea ched in 1957 "Vlhen 13,000,000, or fifty per cent of 
t h e population, wa s enfranch i s ed. French West Africa con-
t a ins 10,000,000 of t he 13,000 ,000 eligible vo t er s. 8• 
\ihat has happen ed in s~ is that African political parties, 
opera ting in this new context of democra tic territorial 
parliamentary institutions and a l a r ge degree of civil and 
politica l liberty, have become increasingly important and 
pov,rerful vli th t h e vlidening of the suf-frage since 1946. 
General Comparison with British Policy in West Africa 
Although much has been 'trtri tt,en about the rigidity 
and the doctrinaire aspects of French colonial policy in 
contrast to the pragmatic approach of the British, violent-
ly chang ing governments in France and the fact that the 
French, like the Br:ttish, had to a dapt their principles 
to meet concrete needs, resulted in reforms which were 
not always consistent with their over-all a pproach to col-
onial problems. However, what is significant is that, in 
contrast to the British territory by territory a pproach, 
a change in French policy aff ected all of the territories 
in French vfest Africa equally and simultaneously. The 
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Gold Coast advanced along the path to self-government in-
dependently. Similar reforms were introduced at different 
times in the three regions of Nigeria. The British sent 
commissions to investigate the "political maturity" of 
each of these area s, and assumed the rate of progress and 
the consequent introduction of reform measures to be dif-
ferent in each. The French gave Niger the same political 
framework and opportunities for democratic government as 
it did the more sophisticated Ivory Coast. 
This policy helps to explain the growth of pan-
territori~l parties in French West Africa and their ab-
sence in the British areas. Cooperation between African 
leaders in all the territories 't'ras fostered. Their in-
terests and objectives rlere the same. The reforms which 
benefitted one advanced them all. United, they presented 
a much greater pres sure group and force to be reckoned 
with than any single territorial organization. An Azikiwe 
and a Nkrumah might have more in common philosophically 
/ than a Houphouet and a Toure, but one major reason they 
could not come together in one party was that their ob-
jectives were different. France's highly centralized, 
unitary administration tended to invoke African organiza-
tions of the same genre. 
An unquestioned premise of French rule '\•ras that 
the overseas possessions were to be governed as an integral 
part of France. Great Britain stressed that her African 
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possessions vrould someday become independent. British 
Africans demanded i mmedia t e self-government. French Af-
ricans originally demanded equa l rights with Frenchmen. 
France's attempt to transpl ant her culture to Africa 
tried to convince her subj ects that once a man had a cquired 
the artistic and historical heritage of France, he could 
enjoy liberty, equality and fratern ity, regardles s of the 
color of his skin, and regardless of v.1hether he tvas governed 
from Paris or from Africa. One mi ght say that French 
policy wa s to stress the cultura l and political develop-
ment of the individual, while the British stressed the 
political metamorphosis of the territory. Great Britain 
emphasized the uniqueness of the African expe r ience, and 
by stressing preparat:km.for territorial self-rule, suc-
c eeded in educating Africans to believe that only with 
the atta inment of self-government coul d the ''political 
k ingdom" be a chieved. 
Unlik e Bri tish pol icy, wher e the forces of decision 
making were, from the first, c entered i n the territories, 
in the French areas, almost all power until recently "'l•ras 
centered in Paris. This f a ct, i n a dd i tion to the unique 
French policy of g iving Africans representation in the 
poli t ical ins titutions of France i t s elf, meant that African 
leaders and pol i tica l parties t ended to be come link ed in 
one way or ano t her with metropolitan politics. It meant 
that African leader s could be more thoroughly inculcated 
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with an affection for France, that they had positions of 
power and a stake to maintain in the French system. It 
also meant that Africans could come together from their 
various territories and meet in a central location re-
moved from local pressures. In Paris, they could plan and 
cooperate for mutual benef'i ts, but they did so "Vri thin the 
context of French institutions. 
In the British colonies, the legislative councils 
and political institutions follow a developmental pattern 
which to a degree, as shol'm a~ove, has been paralleiled 
by the French evolution. In the British territories, un-
official members of what was previously an advisory body 
eventually become elected, rather than being appointed by 
the governor. The unofficial minority becomes a majority. 
The powers of the Governor are progressively decreased, 
while he continues to retain some control, either through 
a body of reserved subjec~upon which the Council cannot 
-legislate or through a veto pm·1er. Hovrever, even these 
checks become held more and more in abeyance, until they 
are ultimately ivi thdrai\rn. In the final stages, the exe-
cutive becomes res ponsible to a popularly elected legisla-
tive body. Direct election of r epresentatives, and the 
establishment of an effective executive responsible to the 
legislature are two crucial steps which all British terri-
tories go through in their evolution to self-goverlli~ent. 
With the introduction of -the Loi Cadre, the French terri-
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t ories have also been grant ed vital reforms. 
Hmvever , t he linkage with France described above, 
as well as the pull of other factors which Hodgkin calls 
"the metropolitan axis" is believed by s ome comment a tors 
to forstall the logical culmination of t h is pa r rallel tren~ 
with British evolution - self-goverrunent. 
Rob inson has written of this: 
"The na tural expectation of those 
who are familiar with British colonial 
history that establishing a responsible 
local ministry must result in the ~apid 
erosion and disappearance of any remain-
ing metropolitan pm·r er s, may not prove 
wholly correct when the metropolitan leg-
isla ture includes a substantial number 
of over sea s t erritorial political leaders, 
the budget provides half their expendi-
tures, and a substantial cadre of officers 
paid by and respons ible to the metropoli-
tan government remains at work in them." 9. 
In the following chapte r s, the changed character 
of the demands of the political parties=' v-rhich wa s l a r gely 
due to the devolution of pm,rer and the nev-1 responsible 
i nstitutions, 'vill be discus s ed, as well a s the con:t i nuing 
pull of the "metropolitan axis." 
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CHAPTER II 
THE POLITICAL SETT ING 
In this chapter, the ma jor political parties will 
be introduced, and their relative strength given, so that 
when each is l a ter discussed individua lly, the context of 
the struggle will be understood. To thi s same end, the 
political influence of traditional authorities, ethnic 
factors, the role of the European and of Islam vlill be dis-
cussed, for they are additional factors vrhich condit ion 
the development and issues of the political parties. These 
factors, along with the colonial relationship and the in-
stitutional framework, provide the mileu, the political 
setting within which the parties function and conflict. 
The 1957 Elections 
The first elections under the Loi Cadre were held 
on March 31, 1957, and determined for five years the mem-
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bership of the territorial assemblies. Three major pan-
territorial parties emerged along with a few strong local 
organizations. The Rassemblement Democratique Africa ine 
(R. D.A.) was by far the most povrerful, ~"ith 244 seats in 
the territoria l assemblies out of a possible 484, and 
nineteen out of forty positions in the Great Council of 
Afrique Occidentale Fran9aise (A.O.F.). The local bases 
of support of the R.D.A. in the territorial assemblies, 
and the distr i bution of seats in the Great Council is 
evidenced in t he following chart: 1 • 
THE R. D.A. I N THE TERRITORIAL ASSET--1BLIES OF A.O.F. 
Ivory Coast 
Guinea 
Sudan 
Upper Volta 
Niger 
Dahomey 
Mauritania 
Senegal 
No. of seats 
- of R. D.A. 
60 
57 
64 
37 
19 
7 
0 
0 
244 
No. of seats 
in As s embly 
60 
60 
70 
70 
60 
70 
34 
60 
4~ 
THE R. D.A. IN THE GREAT COlJNCIL OF A.O.F. 
Dakar 
No. of seats 
of R.D.A. 
19 
No. of seats 
in Council 
40 
Out of the eight territories of A.O.F., the R.D.A. 
controls the Councils of Government of four. The R.D.A. 
Vice-Presidents and leader s of government business in 
thes e f our are: Ivory Coast - August Denise Houphouet-Boigey; 
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Guinea - Sekou Toure; Upper Volta - Coulibaly; Sudan -
Kone": 
The Convention Africaine received eight per cent 
of the total number of seats and "ron seventy-seven seats 
in A.E.F. and A.O.F. It is in overwhelming control in 
Senegal and ''lon seats in Upper Volta and Dahomey. 
The Mouvement Socialiste Africaine '\'ron ten per 
cent of the popular vote in A.O.F. and a total of eighty-
three seats, to make it the second most important party 
in Afrique Noire, although it is still mainly an urban 
party. Apart from its traditional strongholds, such as 
Dakar and St. Louis, it has its most coherent and best 
organized body of support in Niger, and it managed to 
hold its ovm in Sudan and Guinea. 
T\'TO wholly terri to rial parties, the Parti Repub-
licain du Dahomey, and the Union Progressive Mauritan, 
gained control of their respective territories, and the 
unaffiliated Mouvement Democratique Voltaique made a strong 
showing in U~per Volta. 
The political compl exion of French West Africa 
after the March 1957 elections is illustrated in the fol-
lo,.;ing chart: 
TERRITORIAL DISTRIBUTION OF AFRICAN COill~CILORS 
BY PARTY AFFILIATION 2. 
Territory 
Maur~tania 
U.P.M. 
No. of seats in Assembly 
Th 
34 
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Ter ritory No. of seat s in Assembly 
Sudan 1Q 
R.D.A. 57 
M. S .A. 6 
Other s 7 
Nig er 60 
M.S.A. -41 
R.D.A. 19 
Senegal 60 
C.A. 48 
M.S.A. 12 
UJ2per Volta 1Q 
R. D.A. 37 
M.D.V. 26 
C.A. 5 
Others 2 
Guinea 60 
R. D.A. -56 
M.S.A. 3 
Other s 1 
Ivor;y: Coa st 60 
R.D.A. 6o 
Dahomey 60 
P.R.D. -35 
C.A. 6 
R. D.A. 7 
Others 12 
As no ted in the preceding chapt er , territor i a l 
part i es s prang i nto promi nance with the ca ll to elect re-
presentatives to the Constituent Ass embly in 1946, and 
grew stronger a s the s uffrage was extended and political 
i nst i t utions were made more democra tic. A variety of or-
gan i za tions, a l most ent i rely urban, alrea dy ex isted around 
wh ich parties could be built- trade unions, tribal unions , 
cultural societies, "Old Boys 11 a s sociations, ex-servicemen's 
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organizations, youth organiza t i ons, etc. As in British 
West Africa, the leaders of such bodi es Provided a use-
ful source from vihich t he newly f ormed par t i es could dra'V'r 
t heir mili t ant s . School teacher s, clerks, semi-educated 
government employees, and traders, new class es thrown 
up by the French economic and educa tional impact~· kno1VJa 
in the Gol d Coa st as the "Standard VII Boys", 'V'Tere also 
then available and politically interested. Their presence 
in increasing numbers helps explain how these new or-
ganizations could find people to run their branches. As 
in the British area s, · the party leader played a crucial 
role as a unifying symbol, by giving a sense of direction 
and purpose to a mass following. 
The Political Inf luence of Traditional Authorities 
These new leaders were successful in establishing 
pan-territorial part ies, at least partially by the rela-
tive absence of any strongly organiz ed local ethnic groups. 
Every'tvhere in Africa , large-scale economic development; 
with its demands of labor, its creation of new social op-
portunities and the i n troduction of new value syst ems,has 
resulted in rap id disintegration of the trad itiona l sys-
tems of authorfty. 4 · The i'reakening of the status and 
influence of the chief has been hastened by t he ir use in 
both the French and British territor ies as political and 
administrative instrwnents of the colonial power. However, 
there has been a great contrast in the role of t h e chief 
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under French direct rule and British indirect rule. The 
British, while retaining the final powers of decision, 
tried to maintain the fiction of the ch ief's independence, 
polster his power, maintain his respect in the eyes of 
his subjects, and give him an area of command in '\vhich he 
could truly legislate. In French t erritories, the chief's 
pow·ers were almost totally eclipsed, and they v.rere practi-
cally completely absorbed into the colonial system. This 
action "ttas directly in keeping 1vi th a highly centralized, 
direct control from Par i s , which felt it necessary to 
have a unified administrative system throughout all of 
the territories. Governor-General Van Vollenhoven sta ted 
in 1917: 
"There are not two authorities in 
the cercle, the French authority 
and the Native authority; there is 
only one . The native chief never 
speak s or acts in his mm name, 
but always in the name of the Com-
mandant du Cercle and by an express 
or tacit leg islation from hi:q1. 11 5. 
The French have had no h esitation in breaking up 
a tre,ditional kingdom such as Dahomey, if this seemed to 
make for greater administra tive efficiency,unlike the 
British, lvho went to considerabl,e expense to maintain his-
torical African native states such as the Ashanti Nation 
and the Yoruba People, even to the extent of having anthro-
pologists like Rattray and Meek make studies and recom-
mendations. 
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Within the French .administrative hierarchy, there 
are two grades of chief . There are about t1•'0 thousand 
Chef s du Canton, 1vhere both the Chef and the Canton are 
Frenc~ administrative creations. They are paid a stated 
salary from the territoria l budget, and are directly un-
der a European afu~inistration. The Chefs du Village, 
about fifty thousand. in number, who come under the author-
i ty of the Chefs du Canton, are concerned 1'.'i th the direct 
transmiss ion of administra tive institutions to the· people, 
and are r esponsible for local law and order. Most village 
chiefs are paid according to their ability to collect 
taxes. Access by the people to the European administra-
tion is much more directly channeled through the chiefs 
than it is in British territories. ~ihile the administra-, 
tive officer is available while in to1~ to listen to com-
plaints, it is expected that the bulk o,f these will be 
settled at the l evel of the Chef du Canton, and only seri-
ous problems 'Hill be referred to the Chef de Subdivision. 
Thus, the link betwe en the administration and the people 
is primarily through Africans. This low intensity of 
Afro-European contact mi ght help to explain vvby the de-
mands of the ma sses for ridding themselves of the French 
is less acute than in British Africa. 
The tribal chiefs bore the burden of the African 
displeasure, and have long been in disrepute, for they 
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were the instruments for pressing demands on the popula-
tion for the production of raiv materials for French needs, 
and often had to collect forced labor. The wartime shor-
tage of administrative officers placed in the hands of 
the village chiefs nnaccustomed po·hrer 'Hhich nas often abused. 
After the Constitution of 1946, the chief's authority even 
as a civil administrator was undermined by the grant of 
freedom of travel and of residence, which alloi..;ed a man 
d~ssatisfied with the chief to move freely to another com-
munity. The chief 1 s p ovrer to im:pos e punish..rnent for offences 
under the native justice was also removed with the intro-
duction of the French penal code. It is also important 
to remember that election to territorial bodies i"las direct, 
and that there was no voting through native authorities, 
as in the British areas. 
As in the British territories, the gro"rth of the 
educated elements of the population brought v:ith it dis-
satis'faction with the conduct of local affairs by tradi-
tional chiefs. iL~ti-colonial feeling often expressed it-
self by demonstration of the nevr , young , educated elite 
against the chiefs. Emphasis on acceptance of the French 
language and culture has perhaps separated the evolue 
even more from his tribal association than has education 
in Nigeria and the Gold Coast. But ivhereas in Southern 
Nigeria and the Gold Coast, complaints of the educated 
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against the traditionalists led to the demand for the 
substitution of elected local councils for traditional 
tribal authoriti es, in Frencn Africa these demands vrere 
less vociferous b ecause those lli th polit ical ambitions 
found a more prestigeful outlet in the territorial bodies 
and could even seek election to the French National As-
sembly. The French, generally, have sought to rule \'Ti th 
the collaboration of the elite minority which accepted 
French culture, while the Br!tish preferred to collaborate 
with the chiefs and existing tribal structures within the 
native culture. The French used the chiefs administrative-
ly, as order-bearers, but for consultative and represen-
tative purposes, they established electoral regulations 
which would ensure that the educated and French-cultured 
would sit in the territorial bodies and. the National As-
sembly. 
A few chiefs have survi ved, but none have enjoyed 
the status or povrer of an Asantehene or Sarduana of Sokoto. 
The apparent state to vlhich the customary chief has evi-
dently been reduced is best illustrated by a report g iven 
at a Congress at Dakar in the summer of 1957, at ·which one 
of their members said: 
"If it is true that the customary 
chiefdom is nmv no more than the 
remnant of an imperial past '\'lhich 
is finishe d , and if it has no r ele-
vance in the condition found today 
in modern Africa, should it be left 
in the state of mora l uncertainty in 
which it is at present? 
If, on the other hand, one thiru{s 
that des pi t& the faults vrhi ch it has 
retained from the past and des pite 
the i mp erfection of its members, the 
customary chiefdom has still a part 
to play, it is essential to define 
that part and to clothe it ~ith the 
powers '·rhich it requires." o • 
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This is not the talk of a vibrant political force. 
These people seem not to be worried so much about i mple-
menting any typ e of policy or gaining a foothold in gov-
ernment as they are about their very existence. All of 
this is not to say that the ethnic or tribal groupi~are 
not a political force, and that there are not any tra di-
tional leader s :r.1ho p lay i mportant roles in parties and 
elections. The evidence is mixed, incomplete and largely 
inferential. For example, M. Fily Dabo Sisso'Jko, Deputy 
for Sudan and a former Minister, presided over the Dakar 
Conference of Customary Chiefs. M. Leophold Senghor, 
Deputy for Senegal and head of the Convention Africaine, 
s ponsored the chief-backed Diallo Bill in the National As-
sembly; this bill provides for the r ecognition of t he chief-
dom as a public office with a new definition of duties 
and compensations. 7· (M. Senghor has also, as vrill be 
discussed below; incorporated s ome aspects of tribal or-
ganization into his political part~) The matrix of this 
association of political lea ders and tra di tional lea ders, 
and the amount of SUlJport that the traditional leaders 
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can command, is, hov;ever, cloudy. Also u.rtknmvn is the 
extent of opposition between traditional elements and the 
evolua8. Houphouet's bitter opponent in the 1954 elect-
ion to the Constituent Assembly was Morho Naba, a tradi-
tional leader of the Mossi, and it may simply be that the 
st~engthening of local political organization has led to 
an uneasy truce. Evidence of this is Houphouet's speech 
in a small village in the Ivory Coast, where a member of 
one tribe had killed somebody of another tribe. Houphouet 
urged them not to ffught, but rather to unite, because: 
11 Today '\·re have only one chief: it is the justice of the state •.. 
I shall not cease making appeals for unity; I shall not 
cease my messages of fraternity." 8 · 
Whether or not these jlribal and traditional for-
ces i.Yill be able to reassert themselves and possibly lead 
to a redivision of the country on an ethnic basis vlith all 
of the tens ion and furor "t,vhich that would create, is one 
of the major problems of the future. Additional problems 
of tribalism and ethl~ography will be d i scussed in their 
proper pl a ces b elm·T. What is significant in this con t ext 
however, 1s that at the time politica l parties i·rere first 
being formed, there was no strong praditional organization 
o:e ethnic particularism as existed in the Gold Coast or 
Nigeria, lvhich i'lOUld effectively block their grov;th or 
formation on a pan-territorial basis. 
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The European Element 
An add itional vital element in the setting in 
which the African politica l parties '1-·1ere b orn \vas the num-
ber and influence of Europ eans in French lrle s t Africa. Th ere 
are 60,000 Frenchmen in A.O.F. compa ree to a pp r ox imately 
6,000 British in Ni 3eria and 4,000 in the Gold Coast Ho'l-'r-
ever, the total non-Africa n pop ul ation is a b out 63,000 
out of an Af rica n pQ:pula tion of about 19,000,000, vlhich 
helps to explain why there is a single electoral college. 9· 
The Europ eans are not only officials, traders and planters, 
but they are businessmen of all kinds, vra ge- earner s and 
small shop-keepers. An important segment of the Europ ean 
populating is develop ing an increasing fe eling of . ~ ermanancy, 
typ ified by the increasing number of sma ll shopkeep ers '1-vh o 
have come to Dakar, AbidJ an and other urban centers in 
recent years to serve Europ eans. 10 · :Most of the -.;mg e-
earners are skilled , but there is a g rm'ling stream of the 
slightly s k illed a nd inex perienced 11 p eti t e s blancs" '\r:ho 
get better jobs and higher salaries than most Africa ns. 
Some Africa ns received 6,000 West African francs, about 
~~35 a month, for doing the same '\rTork for 't·Thich French re-
i d b f 11. ce ve a out our times as much. FevT Europea ns belong 
to African trade unions, for their employers i"iOUld regard 
this as ivhi te treason. The Europ ea ns hold the key jobs, 
and their employers can hold out in the ca se of a strike 
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so long as the European laborer s r emain on the job. 
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The administrative body forms a sort of aristocracy 
which symbolizes for Africans the colonial period which 
they are only now s haking off. The Afr i can still needs 
them, but is r eluctant to admit it. The administration 
is \\'"illing to see . . the transition period through, but re-
sents being both collaborators and scapegoats. In this 
respect, French West African socie ty is plural or multi~ 
racial, a.nd t ensions characteristic of these societies are 
making themselves felt, although as yet only to a minor 
degree. A new problem however, for the African govern-
ment> is to satisfy the ivhites who are demanding protect-
ion of their status. 
The Europeans tend to be fairly solidly Gaullist, 
which might also help to expla in why the demands to change 
are for equality i·rith France, and not for self-government. 
Euro-African cooperation is the general rule. 
Some Africans have been anxious to have Europeans partici-
pate in the development of democra tic institutions; in 
vari ous elections in A.O.F., tivelve Europeans have been 
candidates in the Ivory Coas t, six in Senegal, and three 
in Guinea. 13·rn the territorial as s emblies, Euro-African 
coalitions have been formed , such as the one between the 
all-European Ras semblement du Peuple Francaise and the 
j 
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all-African Union Soudanaise. Little information is 
available, but this type of alliance points up the unique 
and potentially powerful role that European colonists and 
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their parties can play in territorial politics by exploit-
ing their "floating vote." 
The Unifying Fa ctor of Islam 
The influence and extent of popular participation 
in Islam is anoth er i mportant factor in the politica l e-
cology of French \'lest Africa. The percent age of Moslems 
in the ·total population as of J 2.nuary 1, 1946 '\vas as fol-
lo'\'rs: IVIaure .. tania - 95%; Niger - 90%; Guinea - 80%; Sudan 
and Upper Volta - 60%; Ivory Coast and Dahomey - 10%. 15. 
Islam has its ovm educational system with over 80,000 
d 16. f stu ents, and many o these go abr oad to the Arab coun-
tries for further education. Al Azher University in Egypt 
is g enerally believed to be the principle center for send-
ing middle-ea stern Arabs to tropical Africa, and for 
training Africans to join in propaganda and agitation. 
Some commenta tors thinlc that because of this type of link-
age, there is a danger of a possible cooperation bet'\veen 
C i d - 1 17. ommun_sm an ~s am. Hovrever that. may be, it is 
true that every political party has tak en a very determined 
stand in urging that France g ive Algeria her i ndependence 
and stop the fighting there. This unanimity is doubtless 
at least partially due to the fact that so many French 
vi est Africans have a religion in common with the Algerians. 
But it is at lea st equally due to the fact that they have 
a common mother country. As r.tla.madou Din, Deputy .from 
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Senegal and Vice-President of the Territorial Assembly, 
speaking in the name of the Convention Africaine, said 
in referring to the Algerian 't.;ar, "Liberty is not assured 
here, it if is menaced elsewhere." 18. There is an under-
lying fea r tha t if France 'tvould use f orce to ensure its 
political policies in Algeria, she might resort to similar 
measures in French llest Africa. 
There has also been reported a ne"t-l Islamic move-
ment..> 111'iahabism 11 , which attacks the tra ditiona l Moslem 
pract i ces such as the sale of amulets and the -vrearing of 
veils, as well as the vices of cupid ity, i gnorance and 
pharis~. Here, as elsewhere, protesta~sm in religion 
is accompan i ed by r adi calism in politics, and its followers 
tend to be very anti-imperialist, and in the for efr ont 
of those vd~o disseminate propa gandistic literature. One 
of the leading exponents of Wahabism, El Haj Morite Diabi, 
also pl ays a leading role in the R.D.A. He feels that it 
is his mi ssion to promote and promulgate vlahabism in 
every territory of French West Africa. 19• 
There are over 6,000,000 followers of Islam in 
French \'lest Af rica .- almost a third of the population. 
One may safely asswne that it is one of the major fa~tors 
which help to unite A.O.F. Because Islam provid ed a com-
man meeting gr otmd for such a large percentage of the popu-
lation, one may also assume that it was one of the f a ctors 
44. 
which helped in the formation of pan-territorial politi-
cal parties. 
In this chapter, I have shown the relative strength 
and representation in the territorial assemblies of the 
ma jor political parties, and then analyzed some of the 
factors i'lhich, together "'·lith the colonial policy and the 
institutional framework, provide the context vli thin 1-·1hich 
French West African political parties function. In the 
follovring chapter, I shall discuss the most important of 
these parties, the Rassemblement Democratique Africain~, 
in terms of its history, organization, composition, and 
issues. 
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CHAPTER III 
~ 
THE RAS S:EiYIDLEMENT DEivJ:OCRATIQUE AFRICAINE 
The R. D. A. is an organization formed to secure 
absolute political equality within a broader Euro-African 
grouping. 1 • 
A national movement has as its naison d 1 ~tre the 
final realization of' a purely political objective which 
involves control over government and therefore, it re-
presents a fundamental challenge to the status quo. 
A political party is an organization which competes 
with other similar organizations in periodical elections 
in order to participate in formal institutions, and thereby 
influence and control the personnel and policy of government. 
It accepts the constitutional status at least for the 
time being. 2 • 
The R. D.A., in the 1-rords of its founder Felix 
Houphouet-Boigny, is 
"The most powerful African political 
movement - a movement which continues 
to thiS very day to denounce the 
abuses and errors of colonialism and 
to call untiringly for justice and 
equality." 3. 
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Modibo Keita, a former Secretary of State ~or Overseas 
France, and Deputy from Sudan, in a ttRapport d'Organiza-
tion" presented at the: B.~ D;.A. Bamako Conference in 1957, 
defined the R.D.A. as being 
" ••• a movement rihere there is found 
assembled together all races, where 
there is found all political philos-
ophies and all religions, where there 
is grouped together all diverse inter-
ests." 4. 
It was another factor which enabled the R.D.A. to be so 
successful throughout the territories of West Africa, a 
truly unique achievement. But, paradoxically, t he more 
successful t~e R.D.A. has been in achieving this objec-
tive, the more has divisive f a ctors assert ed themselves. 
This is because political equality, once attained, is no 
longer an end to be striven for, but a precondition for 
a climate in i-Thich many diverse interests may conflict. 
The attainment of political freedom itself is not an ab-
solute thing, but involves questions of degree. Some ele-
ments in any movement such as the R.D.A. will be willing, 
for various rea sons, to cease their struggle at a time 
sooner than will others, and struggles between the varied 
interests "''lill then ensue. 
Formation and Early History 
The R.D.A. is also a political party, and as 
noted earlier, ~~s been eminently successful in contesting 
and winning elections. In 1945, Houphouet founded the 
Democratic Party of the Ivory Coast, and in September, 
1946, at the time of the Bamako Conference, it became the 
R.D.A. 
As in the formation of most African political 
parties, a prior existing organi zation provided the base 
for the Democratic Party of the Ivory Coast, and this was 
the Syndicat Agricole Africain, whose main object was to 
protect the interests of small African farmers against 
the larger French planters and commercial houses. 
The idea for the Syndicat was conceived by Georges-
Emmanuel Vilasco, an Ivory Coast businessman, in order to 
allow the indigenous planters to benefit from the agricul-
tural loans of the Cre'di t Agricole 1~utuel, an agency of 
the French Gover~~ent which only gave loans to farms of a 
certain size. An AgriculDural Society of sufficient 
strength would have enough reserves to allow cocoa to be 
sold und.er the best conditions. Vilas co failed, because 
nobody i'tanted to be the first to try his plan. The plan 
was warmly embraced by Houphouet, and eleven years later, 
so. 
he "''ras successful because, by that time , African pl anters 
has become isolated and too small to be eff icient in the 
face of the competition provided by the hug e plantations 
establis hed by the French. Als o, fines were instituted 
by the Government for failure to keep up farms and houses 
given to plantations of over twenty-five hectacres in or-
der to encourage pro duction. In 1944, when the Syndicat 
was finally formed, Africans could compete with Europ ean 
5-firms, eliminate middle-men, and contract for l aborers. 
From Se.ptember 1945, before the legislative e lect-
ions, the Syndicat was in fact transforme d into a political 
organize_ t ion. :Members of the Syndic at elected delegates, 
who were for t h e most part Chefs du Village or Chefs du 
Canton, to a Congress, where they chose one of t heir mem-
bers, ,;-Tho they were sure Hould defend thc:: ir interests in 
France, to be a political cand i date. 
Three t endenci es develpped among the Africans 
during this campaign for elections t o. the fi r st Const i tu-
tional Convention. One t en dency '\vas called the Party of 
the Intell ectuals, and had a s its ca ndidate a lav.ryer, 
Kouame Benzeme. Houphouet r epre s ented the Party of the 
"Si~ Cercles of the \~e st 11 , v1hich is primarily Baoule conn-
try. The f a ct that Houphouet is a member of a family of 
minor chiefs of the Baoule is probably a factor in his 
s uccess, for the Baoule nmnber 500,000 and represent be-
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t'tveen twenty and t\venty-five percent of the population of 
the Ivory Coast. The third party was a Mos s i group , led 
by the ~nperor of the Mossi, Morbo-Naba, and it had as its 
candidate a chief, Le Baloun Naba. 
Before the election, Houphouet sent an a gent to 
the Emperor to conclude a pact '"i th 1\~orbo-Naba, but, to the 
deep surprise of Houphouet and his followers, the Emperor 
would not agree, and he designated as his candidate a loyal 
and deeply respected member of the traditional hiera rchy 
who did not seem to quali~J, since he did not speak French. 
During the campaign , Houphouet had as election agents 
various Chefs du Canton, the regional delegates of the Syn-
dicat Agricole Africain, and an especially important team 
of Seneglaise, much experienced in electoral tactics. 6 · 
During the course of the campa ign, neither Houphouet 
nor his agents mentioned the true object of the Constitu-
tional Convention - the Const i tutiona l problem . This sub-
ject was thought to be too abstract to be treated before 
the ignorant mass es. They discussed increased liberties, 
ra ising the price of produce, building schools and hospitals, 
and the supression of taxes. 
The l awyer Benzeme exposed with rare eloquence the 
constitutional problem and appealed to the good senses of 
the intellectuals, but he only got several hunctred 'V!otes. 
Naba campaigned on the theme of the reconstitution 
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of Upper Volta and the liberation of the Volta peoples 
from the exploitation of the Ivory Coast. After the bal-
loting on October 21, Houphouet wa s elected by 12,650 votes 
to 11,620 for Naba. 7· 
After the elction, Houphouet tried to absorb the 
party of :r-1 . Benz~me,which had an important number of intel-
lectuals. Hol·Tever, it chose to :pursue an independent policy, 
saying it preferred to glean the best ideas from all sources, 
and adopted the name Parti Progressiste de la COte d'Ivorie. 
In fact, the members were frightened by the leftist leanings 
of Houphouet's party. 
In the North, the Mossi group constituted L'Union 
Voltaique with the participation of European r epre s entatives 
of the Catholic Movement Republic Populaire, a branch· ·of a 
metropolitan politica l party. 
A second attempt "''Tas made by Houphouet 1 s Democratic 
Party of the Ivory Coast to absorb the Progressives on 
July 12, 1946. Speakers· declared that they should forget 
their pas t differences and c ons ider only the future of the 
Ivory Coast, which their division compromised. 
/ 
After intervention by Etie~~e Djaument and Ouezzin 
Coulibaly of the Democrats and Kacoa Aoula of the Progres-
sives, an agreement vta.s reached that the t'vo parties, "'"hile 
guarding their independent policy should conjugate their 
efforts in view of the supreme efforts needed for the Ivory 
Coast". 8 • 
Disagreement horrever, continued bet1-reen the ti'TO 
factions until September 1946, 1·1hen the R. D.A. 'Vtas founded, 
after a conference of African leader s from the territories 
of French \'lest and Equatorial Africa. A "Manifesto of the 
R.D.A.u was issued at this time and signed by Houphouet, 
Gu~ye, Tchicago, Sissoko, Diallo and D'Arboussier. Its 
opening vvords 1vere: "Reaction is attempting to frighten 
public op inion '\'lith a bogey - the bogey of the advance of 
the oversea s peoples to-vrards liberty. 11 9 • The R. D.A. was 
founded soon after the rejection of the very liberal con-
stitution created by the First Constituent Assembly. One 
of the main reasons it was created by French West African 
leaders was so it could be used as a weapon against the 
"leaders of rea ction", French commercial and financial in-
terests, 1vho had aroused public sentiment a gainst the First 
Constitution and \•Tho, the R.D.A. leaders felt, ·were trying 
to restrict African political rights. 
The history of the R.D.A. from this time on is 
divided into t'\vO phases. During the first stage of its 
grow·th it adopted the program and methods of the Communist 
Party. There had been three Africans elected to the First 
French Constitutional Assembly- Houphouet (Ivory Coast), 
Gabriel D'Arbous s ier (I-Uddle Congo), and Sissoko (Sudan). 
When they arrived in France, they allied themselves '\·Tith 
the Communist P.arty, which had the most radical and liberal 
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reform program for the colonies, a n d v-Thich favored inde-
p endence. French Communist agents helped the R.D.A. to 
organize effectively in Africa. The R.D.A. was encouraged 
in this program by the French Governor Latrille, '!;Tho was 
also a Communist. 
The election program of the R. D.A. in 1946 ·Nas con-
sidered very daring at the time, for it demanded su~pres­
sion of forced l abor, total equality with vrhi te men, and 
universal suffrage. Only Houphouet and Sissoko were re-
elected to the Second Constituent Assembly. 
For the next few years, led by d'Arboussier, who 
had become Secretary-General of the Pa rty, the R.D.A. be-
came more violent, more orthodox Communis t in tone. Be-
cause of the personal following and respect for Sissoko 
and Houphouet, it was strongest in the Sudan and the Ivory 
Coast. They added demands for the development of political 
organs proper to Africans,whose relations with France were 
to be determined by bilateral agreement. 
During this Communist phase, however, the R. D.A. 
\vas not too successful in developing its strength, and, in 
fact, it rapidly deteriorated. The old Progressive faction 
lvithin the R.D.A., led by Benzeme, '\·ranted a more moderate 
policy in dealing \vi th the French, and '\vould have no part 
of Communist ideology and tactics. They broke away on ~~y 9, 
1947, and they again established an independent party. 
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In 1947, the Communist Party cea sed to have a part 
in the French government, and any influence they might h ave 
been able to exert nov-r had disappeared. A ne1·1 Governor, 
M. L. Rechoux, was sent to the Ivory Coast in 1948 to re-
place Latrille, and he immediately took steps a gainst what 
he considered the subversive action of the R. D.A. The 
anti-French line of the R. D.A. in reaction became more 
severe. Its leaders visited Russia. The use of force and 
violence on both sides seemed likely, and in fact, did oc-
cur. In 1949, there were riots in Abidjan, follm·Ied by 
other violent incidents in the Ivory Coast in January and 
February of 1950. 
The R.D.A. was losing masssupport. In January 1949, 
.; ,. , 
a ne"tor party v1as formed, Le Bloc Democratic Ebourneen, by 
the same people who, four years earlier, had supported 
Houphouet for the Const i tutional Convention. This new 
party was not too successful, for a pparently its meetings 
were broken up by R.D.A. demonstrators. 10• 
Another party was formed by R.D.A. dis s i dents, 
the Independen ts, a creation of a Baoule chief, Moussa 
Coulibaly, and an ex-teacher N 'Din Koffi, l.rho i·J ished to dis-
engag e t h emselves from any foreign aff ilia tion. A consider-
able number of members of the Territorial Assembly of the 
Ivory Coast, elected on the R.D.A. ticket, deta ched themselves 
from that party. Increasing pressure was appl i ed by the 
territorial government. It was transparantly obvious that 
there was no future for the R.D.A. in its affilia tion with 
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the Communist Party. Houphouet favored "VTi thdra l•ral and a 
mo derate policy, b eca use a f filia tion with the Communists 
was in no way advantageous at that time. It stood in the 
way of a regrouping of African parties, which they were 
trying to ach j_ eve, especially the much desired alliance 
bet"Vreen the R. D.A. and the Indep enden ts d' Outre Mer, an 
independent group . The a dministra tion wa s also given a 
pretext for a policy of r epression which made it dif ficult 
for the R.D.A. to operate at all. Houphouet's tendence 
preva iled, and in July 1950, the R.D.A. left the Communist 
Party and associated themselves 1"lith t he U. D.S.R. of France, 
a modera tely leftist party. D'Arboussier was excluded from 
the R. D.A. 
From 1950 to the Present 
The R. D.A. became no longer revolutionary but 
reformist. It advocated self-government for the African 
territories, and the establishment of a French Federal Con-
sti t ution. Houphouet expla i ned this shi ft in policy by 
saying that masses ,,.Tere not divided into ppposing classes, 
and that the vast majority of the French p eople could be 
enlisted on the side of the Africans. 
Houphouet, African, doctor, planter, Baoule chief, 
former mayor of Abidjan and delegate to both Constitutional 
Assemblies and the French National Assembly, leader of the 
largest African poli tical party and territorial councilor, 
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quickly gained eminence in French politics. He was ap-
pointed Minister of State of the French Government, dealing 
with African problems, and he 11as a leading colla bora tor 
in drcnving up the 1956 Loi Cadre. Both Houphouet and his 
party novr prospered. After the election of 1956, the R. D.A. 
ga ined eight seats in the National Assembly and took 
part in the French and local governments. 
Organizational Structure and Social Base 
A good deal of the success of the R. D .. A. is due to 
its excellent organization. The French Connunist Party 
was of invaluable assistance in the construction of an ef-
ficient hierarchical system based on grass roots support. 
A basis for this structure, at least in the Ivory Co a.st, 
had ex isted since the second quarter of t he century. 
D'Aby states that: 
11 0ne of the most curious phenomena 
recorded in the Ivory Coast follovTing 
the liberation (First '\ITorld Vlar) is 
the very marked tendency of the autoch-
tone elite tov1ards the creation of 
reg ional association and this phenome-
non is t he more interesting to point 
out b ecause it occurred nowhere else, 
not even in the Gold Coast or in 
Senegal. It remains s pecifically I-
vory Coastian." 11. 
These associations t ried to include all the inhabitants 
of a cercle or of several united cercles. During the 
period from 1928 to 1938, there were apparently some Ivory 
Coastians v1ho '\'tanted to lower ethnic bari:Jiers and form a 
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national union, but they had fail ed on a genera l level to 
face the different clans. Att empts l'rere therefore made to 
unite the different tribes at the l evel of the subdivision or 
of the cercle, and hope for the fusion, 't'Ihich they vrere not 
able to achieve, to occur sometime in the future. In the 
meantime, they strove for the progress of their province. 
They encouraged the collaboration of the ne"~d , young evoluE:!s 
with the traditional leaders, but insisted, where needed, 
on substituting the intellectua l elite for the chiefs still 
accustomed to outmoded concepts. But to arrive at union, 
some extraordinary force was necessary, vThich '\vould sur-
pass the means of action at the disposal of each group. 
One instrument \'Tas a highly organized political party. 
The organization of the R.D.A. was originally es-
tablished at the Bamako Conference of 1946. The pasic unit 
of the party is the local branch, or in the tmms, the 
't'lard. These units are called the "comite de village" and 
"comi te de quartiern. Above these basic units, there is a 
pyramidica l form of organization - constituency parties, 
regional executives, national ex ecutive, s ous-sections, and 
sections - ,.,i th provisions made for the election of execu-
tive committees by delegate conferences at each level. The 
party annual conference receives reports on organiza tion 
and membership, finance, propaganda, youth, an d 1·.roman' s 
work, economic and social affairs, local government, etc. 
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It passes nmnerous resolutions, defines party policy, ap-
proves the party's electoral program, and elects the national 
ex ecutive committee. 12. 
The local leadership , a s in all politica l parties, 
consists in a rule of members of the local intelligensia-
clerks , teachers - of women as well as of men, and of people 
who are also active in some other type of organization, 
such as tribal unions, trade unions or fa rmer 's associations. 
Members of the Territorial Assemblies are generally middle-
class evolues - teachers, na tive administrators and plan-
D. 
ters. 
The highest governing body of the R.D.A., is cen-
tral committee , is ca lled the "Bureau of the Committee of 
Coordination". Its members include the President - Hou-
phouet, and four Vice-Presidents - Tour~, Modibo Keita, 
\ Gabriel Lisette, and Doudou Gueye, as well as the follow-
ing R.D.A. governmental leaders: D'Arboussier - President 
of the Grand Council of A.O.F.; Hamani Diori- a Vi ce-Pres i-
dent of the National As s embly; Coulibaly - Vice-President 
of the Council of Government of Upper Volta; Philippe Yace-
Vice-President of the Territorial Assembly of the Ivory 
Coast; A. Homadegbe- Leader of the Dahomey section of the 
R.D.A.; Leon M'Ba- Vice-President of the Council of Govern-
ment of Gabon. 14• 
The reorganization project of the R.D.A. outlined 
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at the Bamako Congress in 1957 fo r e&a\v a vertical organi-
zation s t arting out from the Bureau of the Committee of 
Coordina tion and ending in the village committees, as well 
as an horizontal organization of youths and 1-romen. The im-
portance of enlisting women and youth, especially African 
students in France, "Vra s heavily underscored. It 1-.ras also 
declared at this Congress that the development and dynamism 
of the R.D.A. depended mostly on the terr itorial organiza-
tions and the indispensable lias on betiveen the territorial 
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sections and the Committee of Coordination. The fol-
lowing chart g ives the organization of the R. D.A. in French 
\'lest Africa: 
ORGANIZATION OF R. D.A. I N FREq CH vffiST AFRICA 
Senegal 
Guinea 
Ivory Coast 
Dahomey 
Ni ger 
Upper Volta 
French Sudan 
Mauretania 
Territorial Branches 
Mouvement Populaire Senega laise 
Parti Democratique Guineen 
Parti Democratique de la 
Ct>'te d'Ivorie 
Union Democratique Dahomeen 
Parti Progressiste Nigerien 
Parti Democratique Unifie 
Union Soudanaise 
nil 
Territorial Leaders 
Doudou Gueye 
Sekou Toure 
August Denise 
A. Homadegbe 
Hm,:ani Diou 
Ousuane Ba 
Modibo Keita 
A party such as the R. D.A. is extremely eff icient 
not only because it can depend on an organized, politically 
conscious body of supporters, but also because it possesses 
a continua lly functioning central office, as well as some 
regional and bran ch offices, and employs a staff of full-
time party officia ls with a dministrative and organizational 
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responsibilities. The cost of maintaining such a struc-
ture is high, and the R. D.A., lik e other parties, is in 
the process o:f '~:Torking out a system o:f admission :fees and 
membershi p dues. It is also in the process of establish-
ing a pan-territorial ne\rmpaper as a means of empha sizing 
unity and of dissemina ting propaganda. 16 • 
Independence vs. Interdenendence 
This pm1erful politica l movement vli th a turbulent 
and radical history accepted and worked ·within the :frame-
work a nd ideology provided by the I mperial country. Until 
1958 , independence was not an issue in French West Africa. 
The French standards of liberty, equality an d f r a ternity 
were accepted and demanded for Africans within a Franco-
African community. Robinson ha s \vritten of the situation-
in the French territories: 
nit can be said that there are no 
nationalist parties in the sense 
of practica l pa rties openly ca mp-
aigning for separa tion or indep en-
dence. On the other hand , t here 
are many indica t i ons of the wi de-
sprea d preoccupation with t he moder-
nization of their countries an d the 
demand for equality which character-
ize national psychology." 17. 
Until the Loi Cadre of 1956, the attention of A:fri-
cans generally wa s concentra ted on gaining a univer s a l 
franchise, the abolition of tvJO electoral r olls vrith the 
vote o:f an African being equal to t hat · o:f a Frenchman, and 
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the grant of equal pay and opportunity in the public ser-
vice. 
Indepen dence until 1958 was never an issue. State-
ments of Af rican l eader s a s t o why t h ey a r e content to re-
main vr i thin the French Union r eveal a sophi s tica ted a ware-
ness of the complex ities of interdependent industrial 
civiliza tion tha t is uni que in a ll of Africa. They admit 
that t h e example of Ghana is a ppes,ling , but cite both poli-
tical and economic reas ons for 1vishing to remain 1·1 i thin 
the French Union. 
One of the major r easons for this feeling , a gain 
until r ecently, was that the great ref orm of the Loi Cadre 
of 1957 left them with the exhilarating feeling of parti-
cipating in a decolonization enterprise conducted by the 
imperial countr y. M. Hamani Diou, a major leader of the 
R. D.A. and Vice-President of the National Assembly, ex-
claimed: 
"Qur greatest joy is to state tha t 
France aft er 1789 a nd 1848 is still 
capable of holding high the head of 
humanity every time there is a ques-
tion of freeing t h e human race." 18 . 
The feeling ex isted that time '\'tas on the African side, that 
France ""rrould coop era te Hi th them, and that eventually com-
pl ete interna l autonomy and some type of equality with the 
metropolitan country vl i t hin a f ederal frame~r10rk IVOUld be 
gr anted. 
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Therefore , politicians could make spee ches such 
as that of Ivi . Conombo of the Unit ed Democratic Party of 
Upper Volta (P.D.W.- R.D.A.), without being branded as 
uUncle Toms 1' and banished from office, as would most cer-
tainly have happened in the Gold Coast. He said: 
"Contrary to i·rha t people assert, our 
constituents do not want immediate 
independence, for they knovr that un-
der the present c i rcumstances such 
a desire i·wuld only reflect the selfish 
interests of a very small minority of 
intellectuals. It would b e pos s ible 
to a chi eve such independence only if 
there were signs of political maturity 
on all social levels, and this is not 
true of Africa in its nresent under-
developed sta tus, in which 90% of the 
people are illiterate." 19. 
Houphouet has elaborated at great length the 
reasons vlhy there ha s not been a demand for independence: 
"Industrial and technical revolutions 
are mak ing peoples more and more de-
pendent on one another ••• close and 
substantial economic r elations are es-
sential to raise the standard of liv-
ing ••. to bring about by association and 
mutual ·a i d a more fully elab orated form 
of civilization which is more advan-
tageous for these peoples, and i·rhich 
transcends a nationalism that is too 
cramped, too dogmatic, and by nol>T, 
out of date. 
"We want to coo~erate with t his 
great aggregate vlhich is the French 
Union, because it is t here that we 
can safeguard the advantages and in-
terests of the black people of Africa. 
"Indeed, the countries of Europ e in 
the Coal and Steel Community, in Eur-
atom, and in the Common Mar ket, are pre-
pared to relinquish a part of their sov-
eriegnty, that is to say, a part of their 
national independence... · 
ttr am a native of a territory i'rhose 
development has hardly begun. The Ivory 
Coast could not by itself find the 
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means of providing the lilves t ment monies 
needed to cope with the heavy and con-
tinuing expansion ..• This outside capi-
tal assistance is needed by all countries 
undergoing rapid expansion, whether nom-
inally independent or not. 1'l e wish to 
remain in the French Union because it 
furnishes us this assistance, and does so 
by an arrangement 1<1hich seems to us the 
surest and best eJdapted lt~ay to further 
the social and tehhnical progress of our 
peoples ••. 
"Economic aid from France is not so 
large that it could hot be dupl i cated from 
some other source, but what guarantees 
i'rould we have that this aid would be forth-
coming year after year? HO'\i could we 
control the allocation of the loans of-
fered? For what would we be asked in 
exchange? 
11 Thanks to the Franco-African community, 
our territories will enter the Common 
Market '\-ri th more guarantees for their future 
than they could have possibly achieved if 
they were independent ••• We can continue to 
enjoy our liberties without fear that some 
economic enterprise will interfere '\'lith 
our political life, causing us to degener-
ate into nee-feudalism as in the Middle 
Ee.st, or into dic:batorship, as in Egypt." 20. 
French West African political leaders seem \vell 
aware that real political equality is impossible vrithout 
economic equality, and that if they are ever to become 
the economic equals of Frenc~men, they need more wells for 
their cattle, more local industries, better communications, 
and universal education. On a different level, the more 
sophisticated of the political elite understand that 
economic development is necessary to meet the rising ex-
pe~tation of the African masses for a better way of life, 
and that when these desires are frustrated or not fulfilled 
rapidly enough, the regime in po'\·ler, as partially hap-
pened with the Nkrumah government, finds it increasingly 
difficult to maintain itself in pmver '\'lithout having to 
resort to authoritarian measures. 
In the Interterritorial Congress of the R.D.A., 
held in Bamako in September 1957, the Party established 
that: 
" .•• under the present conditions, the 
most urgent task of the R.D.A. is the 
raising of the standard of living of 
the people by increasing the global 
revenue of the territori es and the 
just distribution of the same. 
"These results cannot be obta ined 
'\vi thout financial means, and the devel-
opment of the African economy is possible 
only through the fast~ possible devel-
opment of large areas." 21. 
Here again, economic solidarity v1ith France vms stressed, 
but it was emphasized, rather demanded, that there be 
African representation at all levels of authority where 
decisions are made. 
French West Africa has indeed enjoyed tremendous 
advantages because of her association vli th Fra nce. In the 
space of t en years, more that 600 billion francs have 
been poured into French Tropical Africa. 22 • Between 
1948 and 1957, F.I.D.E.S. (''The Investment Fund for the 
Economic and Social Development of the African Territories" -
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the French equivalent of the British Colonial Development 
and ·welfare Funds) alone invested two billion dollars in 
French overseas territories, and about twenty per cent of 
this money went to A.O.F. 23· 
Private investment has been encouraged by a num-
ber of financial, fiscal and commercial regulations, and, 
for exa!Ilple, the \'lest African franc has been me.de freely 
convertible to metropolitan francs, but is viOrth twice as 
much. Certain African products, such as peanuts and cocoa, 
were kept at artificial prices above the world level to 
encourage production. Tax rates in Africa are considerably 
lower than in France itself. Ne\'r industries are gener-
ally tax exempt for the first five years. 
Moreover, France, because of high costs of trans-
portation, unlike Great Britain has encouraged the proces-
sing of African products locally, and there has been the 
rapid grm·Tth of activities like shelling and processing 
peanuts, ginning and manufacturing cotton, processing 
hides, and the local production of building materials. In 
Dakar in 1955, there were thirteen peanut processing fac-
tories - some with refactories and soap works, fourteen 
textile mills, seventeen sa·w mills using local timher, and 
a shoe factory producing 1.3 million shoes a year. 24. 
In another five years, vlhen the European Common 
Iviarket Treaty comes into force, the overseas territories 
67. 
of the six Common Market countries, including French 
·vlest Africa, will be also a ssocia ted. They i"lill then 
benefit greatly from investment cap ital, particularly 
from Germany. 
Because French cap ital resources v;ere inadequate 
for major proj ects in Trop ical Africa , the French govern-
ment pressed for an agreement tha t its overs eas territories 
should have a m~jor share of the Investment Fund , which 
forms a part of the Common l~rket Treaty. The six par-
ties !'Till put a tota l of $581.3 million into the fund. 
Of this, $311.3 million will be cha1~eled int o French 
territories over a five year period. 25. 
French West Africa i'lill also enjoy preferential 
tarif fs provi ded by the treaty for tropical produce, and 
this could g ive the French territories a consi derable 
a dvantage over their competitors, who are principally 
British Commonwealth com~tries. 26 • 
The en d result of these economic cont ributions of 
the French, according to a perhaps quest ionable officia l 
estimate, was a rise of 68% in the stan dard of living 
during the p eriod of 1947 to 1953 . 27· In SQ~ , the poli-
tical and economic factors discussed above g ive part of 
the reason ·why demands for independence rrere non-ex istent 
unt il very recently in French vlest Afr ica. 
However great this apprecia tion and eagernes s for 
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French economic aid, the demands for equalization, the 
lack of intense demands for independence, as l'lell as the 
plethora of flo'"iery oratory in appreciation of the benov-
elence of France, should not delude us into thinking that 
there is any desire to maintain the status quo, or tl~t 
the Africans wish to become Frenchmen. 
As noted in Lord Hailey's African Survey: 
"These demands (for equal righ t s1 were 
prompted les s by a positive acceptance 
of the policy of political integr a tion 
with metropolitan France than by that 
passion to achieve equality l·rith the 
European which, in the British terri-
tories has found expression in the con-
sistent demand for self-government on a 
British Parliamentary basis. This is 
v1ell expressed by a spokesman of French 
Africa in the National Assembly: 'Afri-
cans had at the moment the mystique of 
equality. They wanted t he same princi-
ples to be estab lished for the metropole 
and for the overseas territories in the 
first place; when that had been done, 
the. y were ready ;t.o tak e account of the 
realities! 1 11 ' 21j. 
-
D'Aby, v.rriting in 1951, only about the Ivory 
Coast, noted the same type of attitude. He l·.rrote: 
11 
••• if these elites voluntarily 
recognize the benefits of Western 
civilizat ion, they are not any the 
less desirous of evolving in their 
proper manner ~ile desirine the mo-
dernization of their institutions. 
They act for a policy of e qualization and 
not of integral assimilation. They 
want the development of their country 
to be assured follo·wing the formula, 
'The Ivory Coast, by the Ivory Coas-
tians, for the Ivory Coastians, with the 
technical collaboration of the Europeans." 29. 
No major political party in French Wes t Africa ha s 
ever considered that the Loi Cadre was the cuDnination of 
political evolution. It was an i mportant and significant 
watershed in history, but almost before the nei'r law 
could be promulgated, there were new demands. Africans 
wanted complete local autonomy within a Franco-African 
community, and they now 'l!vere b ecoming an.."'Cious to attain 
this objective quickly. This attitude is illustrated by 
a resolution at the R.D.A. Bamako Conference of 1957: 
11 The Congres s hails the Loi Cad.re as 
an irreversible step in the march to-
wards independence of the African 
population. 
"The Congress considers that the 
independence of these peop~ss is an 
inalienable right a llm·ring them to dis-
pose of the attribute s of their sover-
iegnty according to the intentions of 
of the popular masses. 
"But t hey consider that interdepen-
dence is the golden rule of life of the 
people and is manifes ted in the ti·Tent1-
eth century by the constitution of 
great political and economic assemblies . 
"The Congress recalls that from the 
constitution of the R.D.A. in 1946, our 
movement had adopted the principles of 
an association freely given \'lith the 
peoples of France. 
"The Congress maintains that a great 
political and economic a s sembly in Black 
Africa is a factor of real POi·ier and 
independence for all their members, and 
they also desire a Franco-African fra-
ternity based on equality." 30. 
There was a perceptible quick ening of tempo at 
Bamako, an increasing i mpatience to have their objectives 
impl emented, a nei·T boldness in asserting greater rights. 
This new attitude is best illustrated by the education 
resolution of the Conference, f or it was a stab at the 
pr ide and. heart of decades of colonial administration-
French cult ure and education. The resolution begins as 
follows: 
"Considering that the colonial reg i me in 
Africa ha s expressed itself under French 
domination not only by political oppres-
sion and economic exploitation, but a lso 
and especially by a cultura l oppression 
tending to falsify Afr i can history ••• we 
insist that the curriculum must be modi-
fi ed to g ive a greater place to the h ist-
ory and geography of Afr ica ••• " 31. 
The resolution went on to say that they wanted African 
int ellectuals to restate the true history of the country 
in view of "the c oming of the rapid emancipation of the 
country." 32. 
Even Houphouet, for the first time, showed h aste 
in gaining the realization of his program. On June 23, 
1957, in speaki~ of the Loi Cadre, h e said: 
"New legal ties '\vill follolt lvh en public 
op inion in metropolita n Franc e is rea dy 
for them, and after the Africans have 
had a taste of administr ative responsi-
bility and have themselves a pproved the 
economic and political necessities '\vhich 
link them to metropolitan France." 33. 
At the Bamako Conference in September of 1957, he announced: 
"The R. D.A. intends to proceed \'Ti thout 
delay in the review of Title VIII of 
the Constit ution ••• The mission of our 
representa tive in Parliament is to ra-
p i dly bring it to completion. Federa-
lism must be equalitarian or nothing ." 34. 
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This virulent stand of Houphouet ,.,.as forced upon 
him by the emergence of a strong new faction '~ili thin the 
,; R.D.A., led by Sekou Toure, hea d of the R.D.A. in Guinea, 
Vice-President of the Territorial Council, and prominent 
tra de union leader. This new group of militants v.ras so 
strong that it near]y compromised the leadership of Hou-
phouet. 
States Rights vs. Federal Pmver - Factions vrithin the R.D.A. 
All African parties and factions within the R.D.A. 
are asreed on creating some form of federation. The basic 
issue, however, is the specific form of federation to be 
established . Hodgkin states the issue as a question of 
"States Rights" versus uFederal Pow·er". 35. The position 
of Houphouet and the Ivory Coast is that the tendency in-
troduced by the Loi Cadre not only increased the power of 
the territorial governments at the exp ense of the metropoli-
tan government, it also ma de the territorial assemblies 
more powerful than the Federal Grand Co~~cil for A.O.F. 
at Dalcar. Houphouet 1 s faction vrants the terri to rial govern-
ments to be g iven total internal self-government and then, 
as autonomous governments, to belong to some sort of French 
Federation on equal terms with metropolitan France. Any 
federal executive organi zation woul d have limited powers 
w·i th no right to interfere with the internal affairs of 
any of the territories. 
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M. Sekou Toure 1 s faction, on the other hand, wants 
a strong federal government. This plan envisages federa-
tion at two levels by which the small local states would 
remain grouped in the larger unit of A. 0. F. , \'rhich \'JOuld 
r have a strong central government. This federation, as 
well as a similar one of French Equatorial Africa would 
in turn be federated to France to form the French Republic. 
A Federal Parliament for A.O.F., elected by universal 
suffrage, would in turn elect a Federal Executive. Legis-
lation and executive power would be transferred to it from 
Paris. The Ministry of Overseas France vrould, presumably, 
'Hither away, and there would no longer b e either need or 
justification for African representation in the French 
Parliament. The powers of this Federal Ex ecutive ·would 
obviously be much greater than that of any of the terri-
tories. This is also the position that has been taken by 
the Convention Africaine and the Mouvement Socialiste 
Africaine. 
Both plans include the conception of a greater 
confederation in which the Federal Republic and independent 
states such as Morocco, Tunisia, and the Cameroons, \'fould 
be incorporated. 
In defense of his plan, M. Toure has said: 
"This thesis of f ederalism v-;hich 
transforms our territories into 
autonomous republics without uni-
ty on the federal level is, in ef-
• 
fe et, dangerous . 
"The frontiers \vhich divide 
up Afrique Noire do not corres-
p ond to the a ctual hwnan, social~ 
economic, or cultural realities. ' 36. 
~-
The Bamako Conference a pproved a compromise re-
solution insisting on the 11 democrat ization 11 of the organs 
of the federa l government, 1vhich a p:pea red to favor the 
militants , but it was so vague tha t it was a cceptable to 
t h e convention. Tour e, in accep t i ng it, made it clea r to 
his dissat i sfied supporter s t hat he r egarded t he resolu-
tion as inadequa te, but accepted it neverthel e ss in the 
interests of party unity. In a special statement on Ap-
ril 20, 1957, Toure said the follov1ing : 
11 I am most a nx ious to state that t here 
is only one R.D.A. const i tuting a s i ngle 
trend and reta ining full and compl e te 
confidence in its President, Felix Hou-
phouet-Boigny. I knovT t hat some people 
seem to t h ink that there are several 
trends and several l ea ders of factions 
in the R. D.A. Each s ection naturally 
ha s its o11m course of a ction adapted to 
the needs of each territory. It is 
free t o reta in it on the expres s condi-
tion that it accept t h e common platform 
of the R.D.A. The l a st election gave 
the masses of p eople the oppor tunity of 
showing that they support the pr ogram 
of r ap id development \vhich the R. D.A. 
has been a dvocating for ten y ears. i:le 
cannot disappoint the ma s s es by being in 
any way divided a mong our selves." 37. 
On January 21, 1958, ther e v1as a meeting of all 
the R. D.A. lea ders in Paris, the first since Be.mako, a nd 
t h e l eadership of Houphouet i·Tas once more affirmed. It was 
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the Ivory Coast passed almost identical motions tL~animously, 
registering its opposition to the Grand Council motion. 
This resolution stated flatly that the Ivory Coast 1vould 
not join a lftederal government at Dakar. It went on to 
say tbat the Ivory Coast wanted direcit union vvi th France, 
and it called on the French Parliament to establish some 
type of federation with the Ivory Coast immediately. The 
circumstances under \·Thich the vote in the Grand Council 
took place were also denom~ced. 39. 
The R.D.A., Democratic Party of the Ivory Coast, 
expressed itself on April 10. It stated that the Grand 
Council 1 s resolution wa s an aberration from R.D.A. policy, 
and that it ''rejects resolutely any idea of superimposi-
tion, be it directors, be it of assemblies, or of executives 
from the echelon at Dakar. 11 It demanded that its members 
"abstain from all participation in the worlt: of this assem-
bly as long as the R.D.A. Grand Councillors would not 
reconsider their position", and v.rent on to give its members 
in the National Assembly ••• 
u ••• an imperative mandate to take 
without delay all means for the rapid 
institution of a federal African-
Franco state in i'Thich each of the ter-
ritories and the metro pole t·rould have 
the entire conduct of its own affairs, 
i'n~ile confiding to a federal central par-
liament and a federal central executive 
the administration0of common affairs freely decided." 4 • 
Houphouet declared that the action of the Ivory 
Coast in repudiating the Grand Council's motion l'ras 
" ••• a magnificent act -of faith in 
the future of the Franco-African 
community to whose bosom one sees, 
for the fi r st time, colonial peoples 
freely tying their destinies with 
that of their colonizers." 41. 
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vfuatever mi ght happen in the future, the Ivory Coast would 
adhere directly to the Franco-African community and the 
other territories were invited to join this community, 
either individually, or possibly in groups of t1·ro or three 
together, as the individua l terri tory vrould decide. 
Houphouet i<Tent on to say that because he desired 
to maintain the union in spite of the diverse t endencies 
within the R.D.A., he was endeavoring to get a certain 
amount of economic coordination at Dakar. 
No ne't'r political problems were created by the Ivory 
Coast decision. In fact, one '\·ras eliminated , since the 
possibility of secession was renounced. African unity 
should therefore not be compromised. However, Houphouet's 
conception of African unity is rather unique and hardly 
chauvinistic: 
uAfrican unity is the only cause ••• 
Ev en as Britanny has found her pro-
per unity in the bosom of the French 
federation, we will realize African 
unity in the midst of the vast cadre 
of t h e federation." 42. 
The Bureau of the Committee of Coordinates of the 
R. D. A. met in Paris on April 24 to discuss these ne'\·l devel-
opments. It restated its original amb i guous position 
that the movement 
" ••• desired to gain interna l a utonomy 
of each ~erritory while r eserving 
the possib ility of democratic federal 
groupings constituted by the territories 
on the basis of voluntary abandonment 
of s overi egrtty •• ·• " 43. 
And it went on to say that 
" ••• the Bureau of the Committee of 
Coordination congratulates itself 
as much f or the seriousness of the 
deba tes v1hich have tak en at certain 
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moments a passionate turn, as on the 
nnanimity which marks the deliberation ••• " 44. 
Although declarations of unani mity and unity con-
tinue to be made, it is now bec oming increa singly diffi-
cult to conceal the fact that deep and probably permanent 
divisions exist wi thi n the R. D.A. Sectional i s m is ob-
viously r ea ppearing , and the pan-territorial character of 
the R. D.A. is threatened. 
The Grm•rth of a Middle Class and a New Radicalism 
How are these divisions to be explained? There is 
a statement i n Lord Hailey's African Survey on the possible 
political evolution in French l•Test Africa, to the effect 
that 
"To judge by the development taking 
pl a ce elsewhere in Africa, the future 
is likely to be d ecided by the growing 
'middle class', and it remains to be 
seen ho'\'; far this cl ass will be a f fec-
t ed by the doctr ine of self-determination .. 
no"V! so much in evidence in \'lest Africa." 459' 
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In fact, t110 nev1 class es have recently developed 
rap idly, the middle class , and also a proletariat vlhi ch 
has political influence because of the trade union organi-
zation. The original virtual absence of any deep-seated 
class society in the ~les tern sense \·'laS one of the reasons 
for the success of the pan-territorial parties . 46. As 
both classes have developed and been successful in their 
preliminary battles 11i th the French, they have more fre-
quently clashed with each other as t o the political future. 
The growth of the mi ddle class '"as most pronounce?-
in the lvor y Coast. Delavignette reported that, in the 
thirties , the cocoa plantations '"ere becoming, to an ever 
increasing extent, the property of the local, native mid-
dle class "which is nm1 rising". In 1953, out of total 
exports valued at 700 million francs, 635 million ,.,ere 
produced by native cultivators. 47· Also in the Ivory 
Coast in 1952, twenty firms employed more than 1000 '~Norkers, 
over 300 employed between 100 and 1000, and there were over 
10,000 small businesses employing one to ten vmrkers. 48 • 
These figures are deplorably lhcomplete, and per-
haps misleading. There is no breakdovm , for example, of 
African and European employers. However, there is a growing 
cooperation between Africans and Europeans along class 
lines. For example, in recent municipal elections in the 
Ivory Coast, the African leaders of the R.D. A. and Etwo-
pean representatives of the Chamber of Commerce formed a 
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common list on vlhich Africans were in the proportion of 
two to one under the rubric "Union pour la D~fense des 
Interets D'Abidjan." They succeeded in '\'Tinning over 90% 
of the vot~. 49. 
There are other Chambers of Commerce in major 
cities which have both European and African members. The 
Chamber of Commerce in Bamako, for example, has jus t cele-:-
brated its fiftieth anniversary in the presence of members 
of the Sudan Council of Government. 50. They sometimes are 
highly organized, as is the Chamber of Commerce, Agriculture 
and Industry of Dakar. 51. 
That this new property Oi~'!ling middle class has 
political objectives and that their vie'\';s get a poll tical 
audi ence is evidenced by the follo'\'ring speech by l-1. Houphouet 
to the Chamber of Commerce of Agriculture, in which he said: 
"I have listened with great attention 
to your understandable grievances, which 
I have myself expressed several times as 
a planter in my own right, and as an 
Ivory Coastian." 52. 
Houphouet reminded the delegates that he had been success-
ful in obtaining a rise in the price paid to the planter 
for coffee from eighty-five to 100 francs, and a fQ~d of 
four million francs to stabllize the price. He then went 
on to talk about economics and political policy: 
"In the fiscal and industrial realm, 
you insist very justly on the place 
of first rank that the Ivory Coast 
occupies in the economy of the Feder-
ation, on the importance of the re-
sources that she provides to the 
g enera l budget ••• you desired that 
an equally larg e counterpart of the 
endowr..nent be reserved to the terri-
tories under t h e funds directed by 
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the Grand Council ••• Already, measures 
t aken last year by the Grand Council 
have . permitted ea ch of the territories 
to enga ge in a measure of financial 
decentralization ••• At present, the 
reforms fors e en by the Government in 
the s ense of a decentralization will 
remedy in larg e measure the situation 
which you deplore, by conceding to the 
territories in the fiscal realm, and 
at other levels, a greater autonomy." 53. 
Most political observers believe that the reason 
the Ivory Coa st is so vehemently oppos ed to a federa l 
ex ecutive is because of her great wea lth and a r eluctance 
to have it distributed for development projects in t h e 
other territories. The rela tive vlealth of the Ivory 
Coast in rela tion to the other territories is indicated 
in the following chart of customs receipts: 
CUSTOMS RECEIPTS I N MILLIONS OF vmST AFRICAN FR~NCS 54. 
~ ~ 
Ivory Coa st 5,482 8,243 
Upper Volta 233 336 
Senegal 5,744 7,145 
Sudan 252 329 
r..:r.aur~tania 14 19 
Guinea 1,233 1,726 
Dahomey 967 1,345 
Niger ~ ~~2 1 ' 7 19,715 
In 1956, groundnuts, coffee and cocoa formed 
nearly 80% of the total value of exports. Senegal was 
respons ible for 40.8% of this global va lue and t h e Ivory 
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Coast for 37.8%. The Ivory Coast exported all of the cocoa 
and 88% of the coffee. 55. 
Besides the fear that the Ivory Coast '\·rill be forced 
to make contributions in one way or another to the terri-
tories, M. Massadou Coulibaly, an R.D.A. leader, maintains 
that the Ivory Coast rejects a federal executive because 
of a belief t~~t it would mean the slackening or the com-
plete stop of private investment - either entirely if the 
federal government proves inefficient, or to the Ivory 
Coast, since there vlould be a tendency to channel funds 
through the federal government. For the same reasons, it 
would probably also mean a sterile dispersion of Government 
56. credits. 
M. Houphouet has denied any such mercenary reasons. 
He has said, 
"There are no economic motives ••• 
If, moreover, the Ivory Coast is 
today a 'rich' territory, don't 
the others rtlll the risk of being 
eclipsed tomorrow? Still less are 
there personal motives. It is first of 
all a question of policy, because 
the federal executive at Dakar cons-
titutes an obstacle on the road to 
federation. Federal Executive? Yes, 
but at Paris, and not at Dakar. - vTe 
don't want to be forced to pay for 
the lunacy of a superimposition of 
services, of parliament, of govern-
ments, vrhich would then force us to 
become dependent on financial aid from 
the metro~ole." 57. 
An interesting parallel can be dra'\~ between this developing 
particularism of the Ivory Coast R.D.A., and a similar parti-
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cularism of the National Liberation Movement in Ghana and 
the Action Group of Nigeria. All three are active in areas 
which are w.ealthy, and lvhose growing _middle classes do 
not '\'Tant to share their wealth l-1i th the underdeveloped 
areas of their countries. 
The new and grOiving radical faction in the R. D. A., 
led by men like Tour(, derives most of its militants from 
students and trade unions, and they tend to regard the plan 
of the moderates as camouflaged colonialism. 
The students,1-1ho tend to be aggressively :i'~rxist, 
pan-African, and influenced by Nasser propaganda, are or-
ganized into the French vlest African Youth Federal Congress. 
Their political action stimulated the R.D.A. Executive Com-
mittee meeting at Abidjan on ~~rch 14, 1958 to devote more 
energy . to young people's movements in France and Africa. 
The fact that the R.D.A. is losing an allegiance that it 
once firmly held is shown by the formation of a new poli-
tical party, the African Independence Party, composed al-
most entirely of students, '\'Tho are campaigning for full 
and immediate independence. 
The post-\'lar gilO'\'Tth of ne\'l touns and the nev1 working 
class is s pectacular. In 1952, where were 370,000 wage 
earners in A.O.F. - nearly 14,000 European and 360,000 
African. A third v1ere employed by the public section of 
the economy, tl'm-thirds by private enterprises. Over 
50,000 mere in the building industry and public vlorks, a-
nother 50,000 in agriculture, 40,000 in commerce, 27,000 
in manufacturing and industry, 27,000 in transportation, 
11,500 in mining, 10,000 in factories, and 1,000 in banlcing 
and insurance. The great majority were employed in Senegal 
(95,000) and French Guinea (62,000). About. 8~% are clas-
sified as unskilled, a nd many are migrants from Upper 
Volta. 48 • 
The French \"lest African unions, because of more 
help and closer relations with the trade unions in France, 
are more mature, better organized, more politically active 
than those in British West Africa. 
Formerly, the workers were organized into branches 
of the three French trade unions, the Communist-led Confed-
eration Generale Travaille, the Catholic C.F.T.C., and 
the Socialist Force Ouvriere. The C.F.T.C.l-ras ·. strongest 
at that time in Senegal, Guinea and Dahomey. In 1952, 
the total union membership ~;as over 60,000, of '\•rhom one-
half were members of t he C.F.T.C. The highest proportion 
of trade union membershi p among the '\·TOrkers \'ras in Sene-
gal - about 30%, the lowest was in Niger. 59· 
In J anuary, 1957, 90% of the organized French Afri-
can 1rmrkers combined to form the Union General des Travail-
leurs d'Afrique Noire. 
The main preoccupation of the union is the status 
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and salary of the African civil servant. This often brings 
them into conflict \vi th the governments, vrho are the major 
employers. There is discontent, both 'Nith the French and 
African members of government. 
A statement issued by the Directing Committee of 
U.G.T.A.N. on the legitimacy and necessity for a general 
strike declared: 
"Trade union action is considered one 
aspect of the general battle of the 
African masses for their complete em-
ancipation from the colonial system. 
The tra de unions will continue to '\'fOrk 
for the reinformement of the unity of 
all African f orces for real Progress 
beyond the LoL Cadre." 60. -
Besides Toure, who is Vice-President of the Council 
of Government of Guinea, there are other prominent political 
and e;overnmental leader s 1,·rho hold high positions in the trade 
union movement. The most prominent of these are Bangaly 
Camara, Minister of Labor in Guinea, a nd Bakary Djibo, 
Vice-President of Niger. 
Since the territorial governments are large em-
ployers of labor, t h ere is sometimes a conflict of interest. 
This t ype of conflict came to a hea d d.>n January 1958, "t:·rhen 
'\'Torkers in a private enterprise in Cotonon, in Dahomey, 
went on strike and engaged in violence. The elcted gov-
ernment had to arrest some of the workers. 
This situation has l ed to demands that tra de union 
lea ders be prohibited from holding public office. However, 
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moves in this direction have so far been effectively ch eclred 
with the argument that the ca use of the unionists can best 
be furthered by having their men actually in office. 61 • 
An example of Trade Union - R.D.A. cooperation can 
be seen in the resolution on the subject adopt ed by the 
1957 Bamako Conference, which stated: 
"Th e R.D.A. int ends to cooperate 
vli th the tra de union movement to rea-
lize their objectives. Considering 
that the trade unions take an active 
part in the battle for emancipation, 
the Congress reeomma::ds to the local 
executive t hat they respect the nor-
mal development of the mass trade 
union movements, that they guarantee 
their liberties so a s to maintain and 
increase the sociai advantages al-
ready acquired, and that they aid in 
preparing social legislation. 
"The Congress, moreover, i nvites 
the trade unions to consider their 
local executives not as bo dies opposed 
to them, but as a ne\v means by 1-;hi ch 
they will ra:pidly to able to achieve 
their maj or objectives." 62. 
Thil? resolution illustra t es the i mportance \·lhi ch 
the R.D.A. attaches to the trade union movement. Unfortun-
ately hovTever for the unity of the R. D.A., the strength of 
the tra de move:nents, as s hown above, is not alv1ays a pplied 
in harmony '\vi th the objectives of the other interests 
'\'lhi ch comprise the movement. Indeed, as will be s hovm in 
the n ext chapter, in direction, if not in underlying 
philosophy, this radical faction of the R.D.A. is more in 
sympathy \·ri th the Socialist parti es than it is i"'li th the 
moderates of its mm party. The above quotation, while 
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emphasizing tra de union cooperation, also reveals a po-
tential conflict betvreen loca l tra de unions and R. D. A. 
branches. It is not unconceivable that in the future these 
loca l tra de union branche s mi ght become the nucleus for 
an opposition party in the Ivory Coast, for exrunple, wh ere 
the territorial R.D.A. party is controlled by the mo derates, 
and the Ivory Coast tra.Qe unions mi ght be led by radicals, 
although there is no inf orme.tion on this subject available. 
The R.D.A. ha s indeed expressed itself in favor 
of a unification of all African parties. This v1as because 
it '\'ranted common action "to realize the as pirations of the 
II 63. people • The factions and issues, however, within the 
R. D.A., have conditioned the possibilities of such a unifi-
cation. 
In the next chapter, the two other major parties 
will be discus s ed , and thi s will be followed by a report 
on attemyts made · at WLification. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE SOCIALIST PAN-TERRITORIAL PARTIES 
(La Mouvement Socialiste Africaine; La Convention Africaine) 
One important result of French education and use 
of the French language was that it provided an i mportant 
channel through lvhich French ideas have been exported. As 
a result, the African political mvakening tended to adapt 
itself more closely to French modes of thought. In British 
~vest Africa, everyone who is politically active is a 
nationalist of some sort. In French West Africa, there are 
\ 
Catholi~ and anti-clericals, Cow~unists and Gaullists, 
Syndicalists and existentialists. 
Nkrumah may call himself a Marxist and AzL:i"\·Te 
may have spend some time in the Soviet Union, but nov1here 
else in Africa are t here such well organized parties that 
are avowedly and openly Democratic-Socialist. 
HOi.; ever, it is difficult to apply Socialist prin-
ciples in an underdeveloped, non-industrial country which 
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is dep endent on capitalist gover~~ents and entrepreneurs 
for investment funds. A Socialist society, in the Marxian 
sense, presupposes a high level of production. In order 
to get capital for economic development, g iven the present 
world situation, a capitalist environment must be maintained 
in order to attr act ·western aid. In pra ctice therefore, 
there is not much difference in the policies of the l:Iouve-
ment Socialists Africaine and its offshoot, t he Conven tion 
Africa ine, and the Toure wing of the R.D.A. One of t h e 
basic differences perha ps, is that the Socialists are more 
programmatic. They have a clearer view of the typ e of 
society they wish to develop , and they accept with distaste, 
not so much the French presence, as the capitalist neces-
sity. The African Socialists are evolutionist. They con-
ceive of new inst i tutions being created by gradual change 
and not violent upheaval. The amount of information avail-
albe is extremely meagre, but in all essential policies, 
it will be seen that there are no fundamental differences 
from t he left wing of the R. D.A. 
Formation of the 1-1. S.A. 
The 1-iouvement Socia lists Af ricaine was based upon 
an organization created by Lamine Gueye in the 1930's. At 
that time, he created the Senegalaise Federa tion, the first 
local political party in Africa, vii th the help and under 
the ausp ices of the French Socia list Party. The M.S.~. 
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has continued until the present i ts affilia t i on vlith t h e 
Soc ialist groups in metropolitan France. In add~tion to 
Guey e , ot her i mportant leaders are Bakary Dj ibo, vrho is 
the Genera l-Secretary, and Filly Dabo Si s soko, leader of 
the Parti Progre ssiste Soudan. 
Social Base 
Its main strength is in the tmn~s, particularly 
among the s a laried and minor civil servants. An absolute 
majority of seats '\rras won in Ni ger and the N.S.A. has held 
its m1n in Dakar, Sudan, a nd Guinea. 
Independence and Interden endence 
In the same way as the R.D.A., the Socialists 
orig inally demanded equal treatment for African and European 
\·Torkers, a s well as the extension of the single electoral 
roll, the progressive abolition of the two college system, 
the effective organization of universal suffrage, and the 
establishment of identical judicial systems throughout t he 
territories. Its biggest success 11as the Lamine Gusye law. 1• 
Until recently, as did the R.D.A., it soft- pedaled 
the claim for independence. Hamma dou Dicke, an :M.S.A. leader, 
who also served as the Under-Secretary of State to the 
President of the French Council, s a id: 
nindependence in itself is merely a 
decoy, if it is not based on durable 
economic and social institutions. In 
underdeveloped countries, the first 
requirement is to be assured of tech-
nical and financial support in order 
to malre up for the delay and a. cquire 
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a higher standard of living. Africa's 
chances for the future lie in its co-
operation with France, a country of 
great authority and great civilization." 2. 
The men-revolutionary nature of the M.S.A. is also 
illustrated when we consider the original reaction to the 
Loi Cadre. M. Gueye said of it: 
''vle consider the law an accomplish-
ment of paramount importance, and 
we must devote our efforts to imple-
menting it, under all circumstances, 
in the spirit of loyalty i'lhich under-
lies it." 3. 
The Issue of Federalism 
By February 1958, the Loi Cadre had been sounuly 
denounced as a passe law, and so utterly inadequate that 
the territorial government could scarcely function. 4' In-
ternal autonomy of the territories '\vas demanded as \'Tell as 
a two stage federal system, such as that advocated by the 
Toure wing of the R.D.A. Since in most territories, how-
ever, the IJI.S.A. is a minority party, there is an element 
of caution in the s peeches of some leaders. M. Djibo is 
worried about who will be in control of the federal system: 
"Africans have need t o know \'rho is 
going to govern under the federal plan. 
One would have to kno\'T the proper prop-
ortioning vrh ich would give confidence to 
all the territories. 
nThe important thing , however, is 
that they should remain faithful to the 
African masses, ivhich, like all the 
peoples of the world, have the right to 
their self-determination. 
nMoreover, nobody should prohibit the 
Africans from ridding themselves of all 
of the after effects of colonia lism, 
whatever form it might take, for 
the need of such a cause is lost 
forever." 5. 
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This statement demonstrates that the M. S.A. '\vants to b e 
certain that France will not impose a new type of domina-
tion upon the terr itories through its role in the federal 
system. It also reveals that there is a fear that some 
territories, presumably the ones not eontrolled by the 
M.S.A., might dominate the others. The proper type of 
federal structure however, should be strong. Lamine Gueye 
gave ;l:the reason v.rhy the M.S.A. was in favor ·of a strong 
Federal Executive: "Only this can give Africa sufficient 
pmqer to make association vtith France, one based on equality 
and reason, rather than vague sentiment." 6• 
Formation and Early History of the Convention Africaine 
The Convention Africaine was founded by a man who 
is a poet, a member of the French Academy, a representative 
to the National Assemblyr, and one of the most sophisticated 
and influential politicians in A.O.F., Leopold Senghor. 
Senghor broke with the Socialists in 1948 to form his own 
party, the Bloc Populaire Senegalaise, founded in the villages 
of the peasantry and the ne"t'l working classes. Its aim '\-las 
"To struggle effectively a gainst capitalist imperialism", 
and, according to its constitution, it "is based upon the 
African Negro tradition rener:ed by European techni(iues. n7 • 
At the end of January, 1957, Senghor brought to-
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gether his friends, using the B.P.S. as a base, and the 
militant members of the R.D.A., and united them at Dakar 
to form the Convention A~ricaine. It aimed at regrouping 
all the political factions in Afrique Noire into a single 
political organization. 
Senghor also founded a separate parliamentary group, 
the Oversea s Independents (I.O~ M.) 
Independence vs Interdependence 
There was a clash between t he personalities of 
Senghor and Gw3y e, much like tha t beyween D'Arboussier 
and Houphouet, but substantive issues are also involved. 
Senghor rejected the Marxist rigidities of the French So-
cialist Party as inappropriate to circwnstances in Africa, 
and concentrated on practical politics, especially social 
development. Phil~sophically, he is still a moderate 
socialist. "Nous di sons revolution, mais non revolt" ( V'le 
favor revolutionary measures, but not revolution) is the 
slogan of the movement neivspaper Condition Humaine. 8. 
He thi~~s that na tionalfum is out of date in an 
atomic world , but \'Tants f ull equality of the African vli th 
9. the Frenchman . 
The i mportance of trade union organization as the 
basis of socia l and economi c development is stress ed , but 
the C.A. feels that it should be enlarged to protect the 
interests oftie peasant cultivators and small producer s,as 
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vrell as the interests of the wage-earner s. Empha sis has 
been placed on the development of cooperatives, "instru-
ments de socia l is me par ex cellence", alt hough cooper a t iVi~e.s 
exist under non-socialist ausp ices elsewhere in Africa. 
The development of a truly African culture is 
empha sized, as well as social and economic issues. The 
importance of organizations and groups b ased on tribal and 
customary a s sociations is emphasized for practical politi-
cal purposes, but, while recognizing their legitimate 
claims, as in the pensions for chiefs, their effective in-
tegration into the party organization and the unity of the 
country is stressed. Complete interna l autonomy without 
delay is nawdemanded, but a few months a go, M. Dia said: 
"In sp ite of the imperfections of 
the Loi Cadre, ·we cannot help tal-cing 
a dvantage of it unless we g ive way to 
a policy of desperation, which none of 
us advocate." 10. 
The Issue of Federalism 
Until recently, they have been demanding that the 
R.D.A. take an unequivocal stand on the nature of the fed-
eral executive, as it did not do at Bamako in 1957. 
M. Senghor has catagorically demanded that the 
federal executive be a real emanation of the federal as-
sembly, which should be dir ectly elected by the populace, 
and not just composed of territorial mi n isters. Senghor 
has been the leading opponent of the weakening of the 
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General Cow1cil and Houphouet's plan of federation, which 
he has attacked as "African Balkanization", that is, the 
creation of a number of weak states which would al\mys be 
dependent on France. The lea ders of the C.A. have recently 
announced, on February 15, 1958, that they intend to in-
troduce two bills into the French Parliament. One 1·:ould 
provide for the creation of federal executives for French 
West and French Equatorial Africa, the other would provide 
for the creation of a confederated union bet\veen France 
and her overseas territories. 
"The -Threat of Big Business" 
A rare insight into some of the deeper economic 
conflicts in French West Africa is Biven us by an article 
by Thierno Ba published in L'UniteAfricaine, official or-
gan of the Convention Africaine Party, B.P.S. (local sec-
tion), entitled "La Campagne l'Arachide au Senegal" ("The 
Peanut Campaigne in Senega1?. 11. Ba states that the face 
of the country is more and more being changed by the con-
flict between the private monopolization of commerce and 
the public sector, and that this problem dominates all the 
others - the difficulties of the farmers, efforts of the 
cooperatives, and even the Government. 
He says that this situation is reflected in the 
rising battle to stop the forces of colonialism by the 
Senegal Council of Government, which is determined to safe-
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guard and protect other political interests in the new 
institutions. 
Because of an overproduction of groundnuts in the 
·French territories, the government of France, rather than 
allo'to'T a glut of the market to reduce prices, set a quota 
for each territory of the amount of groundnuts that could 
be exported. In Senegal, the quota \'tas 700,000 tons. The 
colonial trusts had commercia lized 637,000 tons of this, 
whereas the cooperati~ had les s than 9%. 12• 
While there ha& recently been an impDovement in 
the percentage of the quota filled by the cooperatives, 
big business cannot be considered beaten since the quota 
includes different grades of groundnuts, and big business, 
because of its superior resources, can shift to a higher 
quality, whereas the small producers cannot. 
Since the quotas are set by the French Government, 
and since the present system favors the larg e producers, the 
situation makes the Government look bad: "They (the recent de-
velopments) render colonialism more horrible in the eye~ of the 
masses, they unite together and in order to consolidate their 
well being, they decide to rid themselves of coloniala~m 
once and for all." Big business has no right to interrupt 
the normal course of the country. This is why the Senegalaise 
government has decided to create a stabilization board to 
guard a gainst future surpluses. 
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In this article, Ba indicates another special in-
terest, when he tells us that he is against the demands of 
the Syndicat de Traitants et Petites Commergants for an in-
crease of a franc per kilo in co~uission paid them by the 
big companies~ because the only place the increase could 
come from would be a dimunition of a franc from the price 
pa id the producer peasant. 
Ba concludes by '\·tarning, uabove all else the at-
tention of the country should be fixed on the maneuvering 
of its true enemies, b ig business and the colonial system." 13. 
The position of the Convention Africaine in regard 
to the colonial agricultural trusts is no more violent than 
that of the radical '\>ling of the R.D.A., which claims that: 
" The colonial regime has imposed 
upon the country a dangerous mono-
culture, which favors the rule of a 
few colonial trusts reserving for the 
producer a price of ~isery and insecur-
ity for tommorow." 14. 
In fact, the left wing of the R.D.A. is more socialist in 
this respect, b ecause it cla i ms that one is not able to 
think of rationally organizing the countryside vli thout a 
fundamental modification of the "infrastructure", that is, 
vrithout organizing the customary economy. l5. 
These great similarities between the Socialist par-
ties and the radical wing of the R.D.A., plus a perhaps more 
intense opposition to the colonial regime, has put them in-
to the forefront of those desiring a regrouping and uniting 
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of all political parties. The desire for a united front 
to face a common enemy, in addition to their own relative 
weakness, has led to an appeal by Lamine Gueye and Senghor 
for the R.D.A. to take the initiative in this movement. 
Attempts to form such a union are discussed in the 
next chapter. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION: THE PROSPECTS FOR UNITY 
The formation of a united political party incor-
porating every anti-colonial force in A.O.F. has been a 
major objective of every faction in the R.D.A., M.S.A. and 
C.A., as well as of most of the local parties. The mili-
tants of all three parties are interested, above all, in 
ensuring that Africa be in a position to bargain with 
strength in its dealings with France. Therefore, the idea 
of an .enlarged and unified party which could speak for Af-
ricans with even greater authority than any individual or-
ganization, naturally finds support. 
The Paris Meeting of African Leaders 
To accomplish this objective, leaders of the three 
major parties and most of the minor ones met at Paris on 
February 15, 1958. Each Vice-President of the territories 
said that the Loi Cadre could nmv be considered no more 
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than an administrative reform. Everywhere it was felt that 
the African governments were hampered by interference from 
governors and officials. Quasi-autonomy was inadequate. 
They all demanded transfer of control over all officials to 
the African governments, recognition of the Vice-Presidents 
as Prime Ministers, the end of the Governor's powers, and 
autonomy for the territories. 1 • 
At this historic meeting, all the organizations 
represented agreed to form a "United African Party". In 
each territory, the major party would absorb the minority 
party. 
The program of objectives "Vthich bound them together 
"Vms as follows: (1) Complete internal autonomy to each of 
the territories; (2) A grouping of these territories into 
a federation to whose government the territories would 
delegate certain powers, to be decided upon at a later date; 
(3) The federal governments were to be responsible to a 
federal assembly; (4) The federations vTOuld enter into 
some sort of a republican union with France; (5) The ter-
ritories were to have all the rights of sovereignty, in-
cluding the right to "opt for independence". 
The preamble stated that the party '\'Tould be a po'\ver-
ful means of ensuring that the Afro-French community conform 
to the asp irations of the overseas territories, and that this 
included in particular the right to self-determination. 2• 
The conclusions of this meeting were, in the main, 
a victory for the radical element, as can be seen by the 
declaration of the right to choose independence, herein 
publically enunciated for the first time, and the emphasis 
on t wo-stag e federalism. However, the strength of the federal 
executive 't·Tas to be determined by the territorial governments, 
and this provision could obviously emasculate the entire 
endeavor. The reference to independence rather than "auto-
nomy '\<Tithin an Afro-French community" was a warning to France 
that either she malce advances along the lines laid do't'm 
within an Afro-French community, or Africans would aim for 
complete independence and try to obtain aid else"t-There. It 
is also interesting to note that this demand came a few 
days after th~ French atrocity at Sakhiet: African t empers 
were high, sympathy with the Algerians was at its peak, and 
resentment against the French action '\-ras very profound. 
The delegates to the Paris meeting agreed to have 
their constituents approve their decision to unite, and 
then meet at the end of Harch in Dakar to ratify the Paris 
program. 
The Rejection of Unity by the R.D.A. and 
The Formation of the Parti O.u Reeroupment Africain 
The one, s eemingly minor, area in which a greement 
could not be rea ched, proved the undoing of the entire enter-
prise. A consensus could not be reached on the name of the 
party. The R. D.A. j_nsisted that a regroup ing 1-ms possible 
only if it would take place under the name of the R.D.A. 
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They claimed that its initials "rare more than a name - they 
were a memorial to the martyrs 1-Iho had died in the cause 
of freedom. Besides, the initials R.D.A. did not apply to 
any special territorial party, but embraced all the African 
masses. Ostensibly for this reason, the R.D.A. special 
assembly meeting at the end of March refused to enter the 
regroupment. A more logical reason for this r ejection by 
the R.D.A. would have b een that they felt victory was at 
hand, and tha t they were reluctant to give up their i dentity 
at such a time. Another explanation rrhich '\'lould follow 
from the preceding analysis would be that the moderate wing 
of the R. D.A. felt its interests vrould be submerged in such 
a new combination, and they perhaps preferred to mainta in 
the status quo if necessary, rather than risk a strong. 
federal executive. The R. D.A. hovrever, did not discard the 
possibility of united action. 
The M:.S.A. and the C.A., along with a number of 
minor parties, did form a new organization - the Parti du 
Regroupment Africain (P.R.A.) 
Organization of this group proceeded rapidly. 
The P.R.A. i"lill have seventeen member·s in the French National 
Assembly. They were quickly grouped under the leadership 
of M. Michel Ahouanmenou as President, Gerard Ouedraogo 
and Doudou Thiam as Vice-Pres idents, and ¥~urice Camara as 
Secretary. 3. 
Amalgamation of ex isting member parties also rapidly 
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occurred. The outstanding example was in Senegal, v1here 
all parties, with the exception of the R.D.A., were united 
in l'Union Progressiste Senegalaise (the Senegal Section 
of the P.R.A.). These included the former Bloc Populaire 
Senegalaise, Senegalaise d'Action Socialists, and the 
Mouvement Socialists d'Union Senegalaise. 
A provisional executive committee vras created, com-
posed of 150 members of the executive committee of the B.P.S., 
thirty members from the M.S.U.S., and nine members from 
the governing body of the P.S.A.S. At the same time, a 
provisional executive bureau was created of forty-five mem-
bers, of which the Secretary-General is Iv1amadou Dia. Ac-
cording to the proposals defined at the Conference of the 
P.R. A. , the minority parties rrere to be absorbed into the 
the largest territorial party, and so the structt~e of the 
new Union Progressiste corresponds to that of the former 
B.P.S. The U.P.S. will also possess a new newspaper called 
"Le Regroupment", '\vhich riill take the place of the three 
old newspapers of the former parties• Leopold Senghor and 
La ~ 4. mine Gueye ilfill be the political editors • 
. This organization was so transparently effective 
that the R.D.A. - Mouvement Populaire Senegalaise - announced 
that it would abstain from contesting the forthcoming muni-
cipal elections. 5• The U.P.S.-P.R.A. obtained 80% of the 
vote, and won all positions in the sixteen communities 
of Senegal, except for the Commune of Kolda where, due to 
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local conditions, an independent won. Over 95% of those 
eligible voted in the election, showing the effective or-
ganization and aroused interest in the P.R.A. 
The P.R.A. hov1ever, almost immediately clashed '\vith 
the R.D.A. The Grand Council of A.O.F. met on March 27, 
1958 to elect new officers. Because of various realign-
ments and new elections, the P.R.A. and the R.D.A. each con-
trolled seventeen votes. The P.R.A. wanted an equitable 
share of the important posts of the Bureau. A Nauretanian 
newly elected member gave the R.D.A. his vote, providing 
it with a majority of one. The R.D.A. then offered only 
once Vice-Presidency and the position of Secretary to the 
P.R.A., '\·rhile the :r.-'1auretanian got another one of the Vice-
Presidencies. The P.R.A. became extremely angry and accused 
the R.D.A. of breaking its pact of· unity, in vlhich it had 
promised that it would act in the interests of all. 7-
M. Mahamane Aidara, President of the Territorial 
Assembly of the Sudan, replied in kind for the Committee 
of Coordination of the R.D.A : 
• 
"The R.D.A. has not rejected the 
possibility of united action, but 
it is still disturbed at the frame 
of mind of the P.R.A. The R.D.A. 
will only accept the regrouping on 
the condition that it maintain the 
initiative. From the first minutes 
of the integrating conference at 
Dakar (Grand Council Meeting), a co-
alition agreement against the R.D.A. 
to gain control of the Grand CoUUcil 
was manifested. We have frustrated 
this maneuver." 8. 
This conflict ho·wever, may turn out to be simply 
a minor skirmish, and agreement on constitutional advance 
may prove strong enough for the R.D.A. and the P.R.A. to 
work together almost as completely as if the party merger 
had been achieved. There is the additional possibility 
that the new action of the Ivory Coast section of the R.D.A. 
in following a unique, and apparently uncompromising, policy 
of direct territorial federation with France, will stimu-
late the radical faction of the party into some sort of 
direct alliance with the P.R.A. As sho~rn in the preceding 
chapters, this policy is strengthened by the similarity 
in policy and temperament, as well as by class bases of the 
radicals and the Socialist parties. 
The Stake of African Leaders in r·1etropoli tan Institutions 
Another factor of Wli ty vrhich should be more thor-
oughly examined is the interrelationships and activities 
of African leaders and representatives in French institutions. 
Paris provided an opportunity for major African political 
leaders of different persuasions and areas to meet and talk 
with one another. Together in France, removed from local 
pressures, and from partisanship, and facing a common enemy, 
they l·tere able to form a pres sure group ~11th considerable po-
lver because of its floating vote - a power vthich has been 
decisive on several occassions in the National Assembly. 9 · 
They have also been given positions in various French govern-
ments, and the number of these positions has increased with 
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the increasing importance and belligerance of the ·African 
movements. In 1946, 1948 and 1954, only one African was 
in the Government; in 1955 and 1956, tvfo; in 1957 and 1958, 
four. The four African members of t he Gaillard Government 
vrere: Houphouet - Minister of Health; :Modibo Kei ta-Secre-
tary of State to the Presidence dJll Conseil; Hamadou Dicko 
of the M.S.S. - Secretary of State for National Education; 
Hubert !~ga of the C.A. ~ Under-Secretary of State to Labor. 
Houphouet was a lJiinister without portfolio throughout sue-
cessive governments. He "'as ' powerful enough to bring his 
lieutenant, Keita, in with him under the Gaillard govern-
ment, and he has been appointed by de Gaulle to serve on 
the new constitutional reform committee. 
These African members of the French Government, 
councils, and assemblies, many of great influence and pres-
tige, have a personal stake in ~aintaining their offices. 
Union with France is therefore an important objective to 
them, and they will tend to exert their influence at homme 
in rallying together the masses for this purpose. 
The Effects of French Policy in Stimulating Unity 
Opposition to the colonial system is one of the 
main, if not the major, forceswhich bind the Africans to-
gether. It is important to r ecall again the paradoxical 
situation that, at the same time as the radical demands are 
beco~ing more vociferous in tone, the French Government is 
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becoming more conciliatory. M. Gaston Cusin, for example, 
French High Commiss ioner for A.O.F., stated at a Press Con-
ference that: "'Vle do not think that it is possible to con-
tinue to equj_vocate on the question of independence." lO. 
And he want on to interpret the Constitution of 1949 as 
promising to accord independence to the terr itories, 
politica~ social and economic conditions permitting . vfuile 
there are enough qualifications attached to make Cusin's 
statement vrorthless as a s pecific promise, it has meaning 
as a reflection of the 'ttray in which French administrators 
and Government officials are thinking. As M. Maurice 
Faure, Secretary of State for Fore.ign Affairs, said in a 
recent s peech: "The problem is not vlhether Africa vi"ill be 
independent or autonomous, but what she '\vill do vrith this 
" 11. independence or autonomy. The feeling more and more 
seems to be that the future lies in the hands of the Afri-
cans, and not with the government in Paris, even though 
African claims to the right of independence and freedom of 
choice are most disturbing to the French parties, and there 
are many who have urged renouncing an "illusory independence" 
vThich could lead to nothing but ndisillusion and chaos. 11 
However, Socialists, Radical Socialists, and the 
M.R.P., as well as most of the other parties , agree on a 
wider internal autonomy for the African territories. For 
example, jJn J:;Iarch, 1958, M.R.P. deputies put forward a bill 
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that would provide for an African minister to preside over 
all government councils, instead of the present system, where 
the Territorial Governor and High Commissioner are formally 
in charge. 
There is a line of t hought among the parties of 
the center and right, as r1ell as in French busines s circles, 
in favor of immediate i ndep endence for Africans, because 
t hese groups feel that the loss of prestig e France would 
suf fer ,,rould be comp enstd.ted for by economic and financial 
savings. 
Another v1ay of thinking hmvever, is typified by M. 
Coste-Floret, deputy and reporter of the former Parlia-
men tary Committee, wh ich was in charge of preparing a re-
vision of the Constitution, and who is now a ga inst any sys-
tem of federation in which France would have a minority or 
even equal sta tus with the other participating states. 
This lvould be totally unfair, for France 1·TOuld be supplying 
almost all of the administrative, technical and economic 
resources. A better solution, Floret in particular thinks, 
lvould be some sort of British-like Comll10ntvealth ( uRepublique 
Communautaire 11 or "Communite Franco-Africa ine"). The de-
fenders in France of a f edera lism acceptable to the Afri-
cans are the Socialists and the U.D. S.R., who usually are 
able to r ely upon the vo t es of the African deputies in the 
National Assembly. 
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It is too early to ~ow what the s pecific plans of 
General de Gaulle v·rill be, but his Algerian proposals and 
election of Houphouet, and nomination of Leopold Senghor 
for his Constitutional Review Committee, are indications 
that in the s hort-term, his program of reform will be no 
more stringent than that of any of his predecessors in the 
Fourth Republic. In fact, there is one very interesting 
speech delivered by General de Gaulle: 
11 In French (Tropical) Africa, as in 
other territories where men are living 
under our flag, there will be no progress 
rrhich is truly progress if men, in the 
land of their birth, do not profit from 
it morally and materially, if they are 
not able to use it to the level where 
they vvould be capable of participatine; at 
home in the conduct of their proper 
affairs. It is the task of France to 
labor so that it may be so. Such is the 
end tmvards which \'i'e must direct ourselves. 11 1~· 
The extent of this ne1-r French liberality remains 
to be seen. ~ihile it lasts, it may well become increasingly 
difficult for the African parties to maintain their pellicose 
attitude and united front; internal differences -vrould then 
have an increasing tendency to assert themselves. The 
chances would increase of not only disunity bet".V"een the rna-
jor parties, and the possible radical transformation of 
the pan-territorial character of the R.D.A., but also of the 
reassert ion of nOi;' submerged or little noticed conflicts 
and interests within each of the territories. 
Intraterritorial Conflicts 
In the remainder of this chapter, some indication 
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of these internal conflicts will be given for the territories 
of Dahomey, Upper Volta, and ~~uretania. The selection of 
these territories does not mean that the others are devoid 
of strife. For example, there is open conflict between 
the traditionalists and western-educated in the Sudan, and 
rumors of a des ire of the 1-1oslems of Niger to amalgamate 
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with the northern region of Nigeria. Because of the 
extremely limited amount of information available, the in-
clusion of the following material is intended only to fur-
ther illustrate some possible difficulties of the future 
in maintaining the integrity of the existing institutions, 
structures, and movements. 
{1) Dahomey 
The case of Dahomey is particularly interesting. 
Serious rioting took place at Cotonou, capital of Dahomey, 
at the end of Januar,y, 1958. Two Africans were killed and 
thirty injured in clashes between the police and strlker.s. 
Thirty police '\'tere also injured. The clashes. followed the 
dismissal of 125 African workers from the French ovmed palm 
oil works after a strike. The local section of the U.G.T.A.N. 
then launched a general protest strike which was supported 
by two of the local parties. Behind the stril(ers vras Da-
homey's general problem of unemployment, and low economic 
activity. 
The local territorial assembly and council, because 
of schisms within the parties \·;rhose members const:Ltuted 
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its government, and possibly because of a lack of adeuqate 
power given the Af..ti cans by the Loi Cadre, '\'Tere unable to 
satisfactorily handle the situation, and the Governor had 
to call in troops from Dakar. 14· 
Following the unrest, M. Apithy, Vice~President 
of the Government of Dahomey and head of the independent 
~ 
and unaffiliated Parti Republican Dahomey, resigned and 
called for a coalition government with the R.D •. n·., since 
at the time, he felt his party \';as too -vreak to govern i•rith the 
existing coalition of six P.R.D., three R.D.]l). and three 
independents. Ap ithy originally suggested a union of all 
the Dahomean political parties, but the chairman of the 
Rassemblement Democratique Dahomey (R. D.D.), led by Hubert 
~~ga, Under-Secretary of State to Labor in the French Gov-
ernment, demanded that the Vice-Presidency of the future 
government be decided by "the parties united in conference" -
instead of merely granting it to the P.R.D., and that three 
ministers be chosen from each of the three parties, so that 
"the real needs of each of the regions of the territory 11 
could be taken into account. l5. 
When Apithy indignantly refused this demand, the 
R.D.D. and R.D.A.-U.D.D. _decided to boycott the -vmrk of the 
assembly, and fight for " a political, social climate which 
16. is more just and more representative". 
M. Apithy replied: 
"I desire a National Union. It 
hasn't been possible to accomplish 
this, the opposition parties being 
against it, for they do not have the 
political maturity necessary to take 
their share of the heavy responsibility 
of power." 17. 
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Dahomey then went on in the French tradition, with-
out any government at all, until Apithy succeeded in enlisting 
four independent votes to form an all P.R.D. Cabinet. The 
life of this government vmuld, had not the na tione.l re-
grouping of political parties come about, been very pre-
carious, since the P.R.D. held only thirty-six out of the 
sixty seats in the legislature, and \·ras all>fays in da:r>~er of 
18. losing _discontents to the opposition. 
Before ~~rch 26, the date of the Dakar Conference 
and formation of the P.R.A. therefore, the P.R.D. llas total-
ly isolated in the fac e of a coalition of the U.D.D.-R.D.A., 
the R.D.A., and various independents. 
Arfter Iviarch 26, the situation \·las totally reversed. 
The U.D.D.-R.D.A. is now isolated by the signatories of the 
a greement created by the P.R.A. A conference of the other 
parties was held in Dahomey, and a directing committee for 
the new party was established, consisting of fourteen mem-
bers - four P.R.D., four R.D.D., tvm C.A • tvro A.G.S.A., 
and two Independents.'\.-0· 
Hm,rever , the R. D. A. feels very uneasy about this 
new alliance, and its militants wish to go back to their 
old comrades in the U.D.A. vrith vrhom they had made a solemn 
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pact to fight the P.R.D. and M. Apitby. 19 • 
The situation in Dahomey probably will not be cleared 
up for .., reeks, ana. tt is rather difficult to believe Apithy's 
joyous exclamation when he was s peaking of the regrouping 
of the African parties: 
"There are no longer today funda-
mental differences on our program. 
In the future, there "Vrill be onl¥ 
one program and one desire to 
realize it." 21. 
f2) Upper Volta 
Upper Volta is another territory whose government 
is racke d by internal dis s ensions. After the elections 
of Harch 31, 1957, the seats in the assembly "V;ere divided as 
follow·s: Parti Democratique Unifie (P.D. U.-R.D.A.), 27; 
r-Iouvement Democra tique Vol taique (M.D. V. ) , a local party, 
26; Convention Africaine, 5; Independents, 2. 
By August of 1957, the weak coalition formed by 
the P.D.U. floundered, and five R. D.A. councillors joined 
the M.D.V. The distribution of seats became: R.D.A., 22; 
M. D.V., 31; C.A., 5; Independents, 2. 
In December, what was formerly the minority group 
formed a "Volta Group of Solidarity" ("Solidarite Voltaique 11 ) 
' 
consisting of thirty-eight members "Vlith Oudiaogo, leader of 
the ~1 . D. V., elected President. This n ew group \-ras able to 
take over the Territorial Assembly, and elected Nazi Bori 
of the C.A. as President of the Assembly. However, the 
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clauses of the Loi Cadre proved to be so ambiguous that 
Ouezzin Coulibably, Vice-President of the Council of Gov-
ernment,and his t welve R. D.A. Ministers, were not forced to 
resign. 
The Territorial Assembly passed a vote of censure 
a gainst Coulibaly, condemning his tactics as anti-democratic. 
On December 17, 1957, the Assembly passed a motion not t~ 
cons i der the budget until the Government had r esigned. 
In effect, all leg islation was block ed . This state of af-
fairs lasted until J anuary 11, vrhen tb.ree members of the 
Solidarite Voltaique resigned. From t hen on, t here was 
increasing i mpatience vli th the deadlocked state of affairs, 
and on January 22, the Assembly reconsidered and decided 
22. to carry on with leg islative matter&. Enough defectors 
went over to the R.D.A. to g ive it thirty-seven out of 
seventy votes in the ferritorial Assembl y, and the crisis 
was finally over on January 26. Coulibaly's stubborness, 
shrewdnes s and skill at winning over converts temporarily 
saved the day for the R. D.A. In order to consolidate his 
position, Coulibaly has attempted to incorporate the M.D.V. 
with the R. D.A. He has declared that: 
11 Upp er Volta, a poor country, is only 
able to count on the energ ies of its 
population and good '"i she s of all its 
citizens. She cannot afford to allow 
her self to be divided, as she unhapp ily 
was for several months ••• 
11 The Territorial Assembly, '"hich v1as 
the center of the crisis, remained divided 
for a long time. We have tried to appeal 
for calm and the union af all those 
"rho desire well for the future of the 
country, knowing that the controversies 
which divide us have not made us enemies. 
"The R.D.A. on the one side, the M.D.V. 
on the other, retain for the moment their 
original positions, but negotiations have 
been going on for some time '\·Thich "VTe hope 
"VIill lead to a regrouping. 11 23. 
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In the light of this background, and despite the 
good "Vrishes of Coulibaly, it '\1'0uld seem wondrous indeed 
if any type of lasting new unity party could be formed. 
(3) Mauretania 
1~uretania is also having its problems, both in-
ternal and international. Morocco has made claims to sec-
tions of the ~~uretanian frontier, and four 1~uretanian 
political leaders and members of the Territorial Assembl~ 
went to Rabat to swear allegiance to the Sultan. The 
Mauretanian Territorial Government condemned the actions 
of these people, but there are some observers who feel that 
their defection was a result of a deep-seated fear and re-
sentment of many that l~uretania, which is predominantly 
Arab, v'lill be sw·allowed up and. ruled by Negro Africa. 
Support for the :f!iauretanian government "V1as shown 
dramatically from an unexpected source. Over 4000 "Requeibat 11 , 
the most important group of nomads in the '\-.restern Sahara, 
, .  
who used to operate in the army of National Moroccean Li-
beration, made their submission to the French Government and 
assured M. Mokhtar Ould Daddah, Vice-President of the Ter-
ritorial Assembly, of their faithfulness to V~uretania. 
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r'I. Daddah 1 s repl ;y;r was: nvfe are a proud people, and our his-
tory shows that we have n ever accepted an invasion, ivhether 
it came from North or South." After accepting the sub-
mission of the nomad warriors and expressing the thanks of 
the people of Iv.!.auretania to the French for bringing p eace 
and prosperity to _ their country, and accor ding them semi-
autonomy, he went on to assert that they had no reason to 
envy foreigners, and to ask in the name of what principles 
were the I'-!loroccean invaders trying to create trouble: 
"If it is in the name of Islam, Islam 
is a religion ivhich is universal; it is 
not the religion of one people or another ••• 
If it is in the name of history, that vlhich 
we know as ¥~uretania has never been conquered 
by the Horocceans, but on the contrary, it 
it ive w"ho have been the orig in of I~Ioroccean 
unification ••• If it is in the name of demo-
cracy, the Mauretanian p eople have already 
said '\'That they think of the question by the 
voice of their representa tives in the Ter-
ritorial Assembly, as well as in the Council 
of Government ••• Through unity alone '\'fill \ve 
be able to do anything; disunited, we will be 
vulnerable to our enemies, and our disunion 
will encourage their plotting.n 24. 
France has supported the I~uretanian Territorial Assembly 
and rea cted sharply a gainst the Horoccean threat, as evi-
denced by the follOiving speech of ~~. Jaquet, !-1inister of 
Overseas France, 11ho declared that the French Government 
11 
••• '\'Till cont.inue to reaffirm publ i cly 
and solem...11.ly to the :Mauretanian popula-
tion the solidarity and the support of the 
Republic. ~~uretania 1 s attempts to pre-
serve her national identity and legitimate 
interests a ga inst demands vri thout historical 
or judicial foundations will be defended on 
all occassions, on all levels, and by all means.u 25. 
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Despite the statement of the l:Iauretanian govern-
ment leader, there is no way of knowing the depth of dis-
content over possible Negro leadership, or the extent of 
mass desire to affiliate 11ith Morocco. 
Local conflicts such as those described above are 
additional threats to the unity of French West Africa. 
The rise into power of particularist parties is always pos-
sible. The particular instances discussed in Dahomey, Up-
per Volta, and JYiauretania, v1ere used to illustrate t h e di-
versity and complexity of the problems involved. 
The example of the Ivory Coast on the other r~nd, 
because all of its representatives to the Territorial As-
sembly are members of the moderate v.ring of the R. D.A., 
might lead us to think of territories as comprising homo-
geneous interests. The mistake should not be made of at-
tributing threats to unity only to conflicts between ter-
ritories. Vn'lile it may be true tha t there is a basic divi-
sion between the richer and poorer territories of A.O~F., 
it should be noted that the majority of political repres-
enta tives of Senegal, vlhich vies 11i th the Ivory Coast in 
having the most revenue, favor a directly opposed policy. 
It is therefore not simply a question of rich versus poor 
countries which threatens the unity of A.O.F. 
It is rather that diverse factions have ga ined 
control of the politica l a pparatus in Senegal and the Ivory 
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Coast, respectively, If sufficient information '\•rere avail-
alba, an intensive comparison of the different interests in 
these tvJO territories would yield valuable insights into 
the factors of disunity. Some of the diverse interests 
have been discussed in this paper, for example, t h e clash 
b etween tribal and secular leaders. Also, among the most 
important new interests, were the rising middle class and 
the fast growing trade unionists. The Toureradica ls and 
Houphouet moderates within the R.D.A. seem to be based 
upon these classes, as does the socialist movement. It 
is not illogical to assume tha t many of the clashes in 
the territories, of which vre knm·r so little, and 1·rhich 
appear to be only conte~s of the personalities of the poli-
tica l leaders, are, in fact, also part of this same pattern. 
If this is true, and if the liberal policy of the French 
government continues, then despite the various factors of 
unity discussed above, there will be a continued and growing 
division between the f a ctions which compose the parties. 
This \'Till be com1Jounded by rapid economic gro"ivth. Although 
it is impossible to predict 11hich interests are go!ilng to 
increase in influence, demands of the radicals for greater 
independence within a very loose Franco-African Confederation 
will increase at the same time that the moderates '\'Till 
cling more closely to France and the status quo. At one 
time, it ,.;as vit al for all African leaders to work together, 
123. 
since -reforms were imposed at once ·o~ all the French ter-
ritori es. But now, there is a feeling that these basic 
reforms have, or 1t'lill shortly, be granted, and so at the 
same time that divisions internally are growing , the basis 
for continued unity is disappearing. 
12~. 
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ABSTRACT 
The success of the R.D.A., M.S.A. and C.A. in 
establishing themselves as pan-territorial .movements is 
the di stinguish ing feature of political parties in French 
West Africa, and is in sharp contrast to the ethnically 
bound parties of British West Africa, such as the Ibo-
based N.C.N.C. and the Yoruba founded Action Group. Even 
the Convention People's Party, which claims to be wholly 
secular, originally, and to a very large extent at presemt, 
depends for most of its support from the predominantely 
Akan South. 
This is not to say that certain tribal groups and 
traditional leaders do not play an important role in con-
temporary politics. There are hm·;ever, no comparisons to 
the role of the above mentioned tribes or leaders such as 
the Sarduana of Sokoto in British West Africa. The French 
sought to eliminate the power of the chiefs and absorbed 
them into the administrative bureaucracy. British policy, 
while eventually resulting in the s e,me end, sought to main-
tain the fiction of the local leaders' independence and 
autonomy, and preserved, in so far as possible, traditional 
societies and organizations. 
Another respect in which the A.O.F. parties dif-
fered from those of their British counterparts, was in the 
absence of a demand, until recently, for independence. 
Both the pan-territorial character of the R.D.A., 
H. S .A. , and C .A., and the tendency to demand association 
within a Euro-African Community, are in large measure due 
to the French colonial policy and the institutional frame-
'\vork provided by the French government. Historically, 
there has always existed a strong , highly centralized ac-
ministration, with all power in Paris. Ther e has been an 
absence of an assumption of ultimate territorial self-
government, and little opportunity for legal political ex-
pression until the 1946 Constitution. Even this reform 
established Territorial Assemblies which v1ere only advisory, 
and made representation in the National Assembly the most 
meaningful political right. 
The idea was to burn significant elements of the 
African population into Frenchmen, to have others absorb 
French culture so that they might become French citizens. 
The colonies hov1ever, were to remain overseas parts of 
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France. 
French culture did succeed in winning over an Af-
rican elite 'vhich remained strongly attached to it. They 
attacked the colonial system, but not France. The idea s of 
Liberty, Equality and Fraternity were eagerly accepted and 
demanded for Africans. 
The First Constituent Assembly had a decisive in-
fluence on the shap ing of the character of politica l parties 
and political demands, for this ensured that these areas v-rould 
continue to have representation in metropolitan institutions, 
\'Thich meant in turn tha t Afri can parties vTOuld become deeply 
involved in the party politics of metropolitan Fra nce. 
The 1946 Constitution '\vas i mportant because it 
laid do\'m new principles from which there was no returning, 
such as the grant of citizenship ,,, i thout prejudice to ex-
isting rights, the creation of local and regional elected as-
semblies which were at first merely advisory, new institu-
tions for a French Union were established, as well as new 
civil liberties granted. However, Parliament still retained 
the legislative powers. 
The growing strength of African politica l parties, 
as well as a loss of French poi'Ter i n other parts of the Union, 
prompted new reforms. The Loi Cadre of 1956 was significant 
because it established universal suffrage, provided for 
Territorial Councils elected by the Terri t orial Assemblies, 
and gave them increased nevr pm1er s of legislation. It pro-
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vided for a real devolut ion of poi'Ier from the metropole and 
affirmed the politica l personality of each territory, while 
at the same time it minimized that of the Great Council. 
However, the National Assembly still retained un-
fettered final legislative pov:er, and the pm·; er s of the 
territorial governn1ents were confined to cer tain specific 
areas. 
Nevertheless, African political parties operating 
in this nei-l context became increasingly important and poi';er-
ful. 
Of the three pan-territorial parties, the R.D.A. 
was the most important with 244 out of 484 territorial seats, 
followed by the M.S.A. with 10% of the votes, and the C.A. 
with 8%. ~fuol]y territorial parties gained control of the 
assemblies in ~fuuretania and Dahomey. 
The R.D.A. is s plit into two factions: a r a d f cal 
wing favoring a strong executive government and ba sed on 
tra de unionism, and a moderate branch ' 'Ianting to maintain 
the priority of the Territorial Assemblies. This second 
f a ction ha s its greatest strength in the Ivory Coast. The 
local branch ha s recently declared that it '·muld associate 
it s elf directly to Fr ance, regardless of the policy of the 
remainder of the R.D.A. 
The socia list parties closely r esemble t he left 
wing of the R. D.A. in objectives and temperament. The general 
closeness of all, or most, parties in t heir political aims, 
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has, for a long time, promoted a desire for unity of all 
political forces into one large party. All wanted complete 
internal autonomy, as well as other reforms. 
The P.R.A. \'las formed by the M:.S.A. and the C.A. 
and most of the minor parties, but the R.D.A., while agreeing 
to cooperate, would not submerge itself into a regrouping of 
parties which would cause it to lose its identity '-.rhen it 
felt that the realization of its objectives was so close 
at hand. 
A more liberal French policy might make it more 
difficult for any t~pe of coalition to hold together, since 
factions whose energies, under a harsh a dministrative reg ime, 
would be concentrated on anti-colonialism, vlould be left to 
quarrel among themselves in the case of a more liberal policy. 
There are also local disputes and schisms within 
each of the territories, which i'lill further contribute to 
the difficulties of forming a unified party, and which 
threaten the pan-territorial nature of the major parties. 
A common administrative system, the growth of eom-
munication, French education, Islam, opposition to the French 
regime, contiguous territories, and the political framework, 
all continue to bind the parties toge ther. However, with the 
continuing rise of class differentiations i¥hich accompanies 
the industrialization and economic development of these areas, 
the growing fear of the rich territories of being forced to 
share their \·Teal th, and a growing confidence that major 
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political reforms will be grant ed by France, political 
diswLity seems to be increasing in French West Africa. 
ix. 
APPEI.'iJDIX I 
AREA AND POPULATION BY TERRITORY ~to 
Territor;I Area in Kilometres Total popula- Indigenous 
tion in 1000 1s Population 
Senegal 197,161 2,222,5 2,181 
Sudan 1,204,021 3,643,3 3,636 
Mauretania 1,085,805 615,1 614 
Guinea 245,857 2,506,6 2,498 
Ivory Coast 322,463 2,485,1 2,471 
Upper Volta 274,122 3,325 ,o 3,322 
Dahomey 115,762 1,614,6 1,612 
Niger 1,188,794 2.335.4 2.333 
Total 4,633,965 18,747,6 18,667 
*Source: Guid d 1A.O.F., page 21 
APPENDIX II 
DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION IN A.O.F. ACCORDING TO 
TRIBAL GROUPS IN 1936 (IN THOUSANDS) * 
x. 
Tribal Group Members in Thousands 
Moors 
Tuareg 
Fulani (Peuls, Foula, Fulbe) 
I'1oss1 
Bambara and Nandingo 
M.alinke 
Wolof 
Senufo 
Toucolileur 
Susu 
Mark a 
Diola 
Serer 
Habbe and Dogon 
Songhai 
Kissi 
Anyi and Baoule 
Dan and Gouro 
Kwa-Kwa 
Krumen 
Lobi 
Djedje 
Fon and Aja 
Bariba 
Najo 
Djeria 
Hausa 
Others (no longer belong to any 
clearly defined tribe) 
Total 
450 
270 
1,965 
1,460 
1,290 
595 
630 
680 
270 
235 
320 
115 
305 
185 
140 
140 
490 
265 
140 
380 
210 
390 
260 
240 
140 
160 
530 
2·;415 
14,990 
*Source: Guid d'A.O.F., pages 51 and 52. 
APPENDIX III 
DISTRIBUTION OF TRIBAL GROUPS BY TERRITORY * 1. 
Territory 
Guinea 
Sudan 
Tribe 
Foulahs 
M'alinkes 
Soussous 
Kissiens 
Guerzes 
Tomas 
Eourankos 
Bagas 
Dialloukes 
Konons 
1-Iano:ns 
Landoumas 
Diakankes 
Na1ons 
Le1.e's 
Coniaguis 
:tvlikifores 
Foulakoundas 
Others 
No. of 
Members 
1, 020,000 
525,000 
220,000 
160,000 
145,000 
83,000 
65,000 
46,000 
35,000 
35,000 
25,000 
20,000 
20,000 
16,000 
15,000 
11,000 
10,000 
10,000 
31,000 
Bambaras 820,000 
Peul~s 450,000 
Mossis 19,000 
Songhais 196,000 
Markas 211,000 
Ma1inkes 190,000 
Maures 56,000 
Senoufos 132,000 
Ouas s ou1ounkes 38,000 
Samagos 32,000 
Bobos 75,000 
Tuareg 176,000 
Foules-Baabaras55,000 
Bozos 55,000 
Somonos :24,000 
Toucou1eurs 55,000 
Diawaras 82,000 
Dogons 130,000 
Kassonkes 51,000 
Ou1ofs 6,000 
Dia"'-Tambes 19,000 
Population 
2,501,000 
3,618,486 
x1. 
Africa ns 
2,492,000 
3,452,000 
x11. 
Territor;y: ~opulation Africans 
Tribe No. of 
Members 
Sene5a1 2,158 ,410 2,112,462 
Ouo1ofs 790,000 
Peulhs 323,000 
Sereres 304,000 
Toucouleurs 246,000 
Dialas 111,000 
14andingues 83,000 
Sarakoles 31,000 
Maures 24,643 
Maur etania 566,900 566,000 
Maures 452,00~ 
Toucouleurs 51,000 
Sar akolles 24,000 
Peulhs 28,500 
Bambara 1,100 
Others 1,700 
Niger 2,227,391 
Haoussea s 904,892 
Gourman tches 5,120 
2,225,135 
Djermas 276,631 
Peulhs 270,047 
Taureg-Fouzons291,294 
Sonrhais 126,653 
Maouris 89,834 
Beriberis 164,754 
l·1angas 54,450 
Sudies 56,400 
Kourtey 23,279 
Dagaras 21,269 
Ouogos 2,500 
Arabes 8.470 
Dendis 6,716 
Boudoumas 3,009 
Others 1,734 
Unner Volta 3,200,000 
no further breakdown ava ilable) 
Territory 
Dahomey 
Tribe 
Fous 
Nagots 
Bariba 
Peuhls 
Somhas 
Pilas-Pilas 
Dendis 
Yoabous 
Minas 
K'Plas 
No. of 
Members 
xiii. 
Population Africans 
1,617,237 1,614,600 
Ivory Coast 2,447,961 2,430,000 
(no breakdovm by tribes available) 
French metropolitans and assimil~s - 16,000to 17,000 
Foreign (European, Syrian and Libyian) - 2,706 
* Source: Guid d 'A. 0. F., pages 303, 237, 169, 219, 279, 3~71", 
449, and 379, respectively 
1. The figures given from the above cited source for 
Upper Volta, Dahomey, and the Ivory Coast show only 
the breakdovm into African and non-African population. 
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APPENDIX N 
OCCUPATIONAL STATUS OF THE l~·IDERS OF THE TEP~ITORIAL 
ASSEMBLIES OF THE IVORY COAST AND DAHOIVIEY 
A. The Ivory Coast Territorial Assembly - March 1957- 60 seats * 
14 teachers 
3 lawyers 
2 doctors 
6 planters 
2 administrators 
1 entrepreneur 
1 pharmacist 
1 forester 
1 chemist 
9 government civil servants 
3 trade union leaders 
4 prof es s ions u._n.lmo\'m 
B. The Dahomean ·Territoria1 Assembly- 1951 ** 
First College (18 seats) 
3 civil servants 
3 missionaries 
3 doctors 
2 :elerks 
1 teacher 
1 lawyer 
1 ex-colonial adminis~ 
trator 
1 trader 
1 r a ilway station-
master 
1 engineer 
1 pro~es s ion IDL~no~~ 
Second College 
(32 seats) 
7 teachers 
6 traders-shopkeepers 
5 clerks 
3 doctors 
3 civil servants 
2 hospital as s istants 
1 police officer 
1 Senior Peulh chief 
1 charter ed accountant 
2 profes s ions unkno~r.n 
.,. Source: Mimeogr aphed Results of the Elections of March 31, 1957 
by Election-District, issued by Ivory Coast government. 
**Source: Garique, Philip, nchanging Political Leadership 
in itlest Afr ica", Africa, Volume XXIV, Number 3, 
July 1954. 
APPENDIX V 
EDUCATION IN FRENCH WEST AFRICA BY TERRITORY 
Ivory Coast - 1955 
Public Schools 
Pupils 
Private Schools 
Pupils 
1956 
Public Schools 
Pupils 
Private Schools 
Pupils 
Dahomey - 12..5.2 
Primary 
260 
36,288 
104 
20,560 
334 
43,659 
135 
25,345 
Ptilllic Schools 162 
Pupils 25,051 
Catholic Schools 146 
Pupils 28,497 
Protestant Schools 5 
Pupils 975 
Senegal - 1948 
Schools 
Pupils 
~ 
Schools 
Pupils 
IV'.ta ure tania - .12.2,g 
Schools 
Pupils 
12...2.2 Schools 
Pupils 
Sudan - 12...21 
Schools 
Pupils 
122!: Schools 
181 
28,000 
337 
62,097 
37 
2,620 
60 
4,543 
183 
22,683 
206 
32,347 
Secondary 
10 
1'""816 
' 
3 
446 
10 
2,423 
3 
568 
15 
2,300 
21 
6,888 
2 
!.46 
g 
234 
714 
1,147 
xv. 
Technical 
19 
706 
6 
150 
xvi. 
Niser 
- 12.12 Primar;y: Secondary Technical 
Schools 54 
Pupils 4,382 
~ 62 Schools 
:Pupils 7.487 
Guinea - lli2. Schools 142 7 20 
Pupils 19,103 482 483 
~ Schools 168 6 18 
Pupils 23,666 839' 685 
Um2er Volta -12..22 
Public Schools 87 
Pupils 12,119 400 
Private Parachial 62 
Pupils 8,228 
*Source: Guid d'A.O.F., pages 380, 170, 220, 234, 280, 
305, 349, respectively 
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